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INTRODUCTION
The United States is besieged by an incarceration crisis which far
surpasses that of any other nation.' In response to public pressures
stemming from the fear of violence, politicians continue to success-
fully implement increasingly stringent sentencing procedures to facili-
1. Paul Lashmar, Lock 'Em Up, Throw Away the Key, NEW STATESMAN & Soc'y, Apr. 1,
1994, at 20. In 1990 alone, the United States jailed 455 out of every 100,000 people. Id. In
comparison, South Africa, second to the United States in incarceration rates, jailed only 311 out
of every 100,000, while Canada jailed 111, the United Kingdom jailed 97, the Republic of Ireland
and Sweden jailed 44. Id. It is estimated that in 1993, the United States figure of 455 jumped to
520. Id.
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tate the political posture of getting tough on crime.2 Politicians,
including presidential candidates, often prey on constituents' fears in
advancing their own electoral purposes. 3 Several states, as well as the
federal government, have created sentencing commissions for re-
vamping sentencing procedures to produce conformity for like
crimes. 4 These new sentencing procedures have included what are
now known as "three strikes" laws, which act to sentence second and
third-time felons for a period of twenty-five years to life on a "no
questions asked" basis.5 While these laws have arguably been effec-
tive means of ridding the streets of seemingly habitual criminals, three
strikes laws have also contributed to a skyrocketing prison
population. 6
Three strikes laws, while varying from state to state, invariably pre-
vent the judiciary from exercising its traditional discretionary sentenc-
ing powers. 7 As may have been expected, California has led the
2. Robert S. Blanco, Mixing Politics and Crime, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1995, at 91, 92; see
Charles W. Colson, Let's Get Soft on Criminals! Put the Nonviolent to Work, WASH. POST, July
17, 1994, at C5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File; Thomas B. Edsall, Failure to
Punish Misdemeanors Fuels Violence, St. Louis Officials Say, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1994, at A8,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File; Taking a Rational Approach to Crime, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Jan. 20, 1994, at A14, available in LEXIS, News Library, Atljnl File; Susan
Yoachum, Public, Politicians Agree: Get Tough on Felons, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 18,
1994, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sfchrn File; David Zucchino, Is Violence at an
All-Time High? Look Again, ORANGE CoUNTY REG., Nov. 18, 1994, at G1, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Ocreg File.
3. See supra note 2; see also Crime-Fighter Claim Bears Scrutiny, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Sept. 19, 1996, at 28, available in LEXIS, News Library, Omwhld File; Finlay Lewis, Dukakis
Displays More Compassion for Criminal than Victim, Bush Says, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB.,
Oct. 8, 1988, at A10, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sdut File; Sam Vincent Meddis, All 3
Candidates Talking Tough, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 1992, at 1OA; David Shribman, Campaign '88:
Dukakis is Coming Under Stepped Up Attacks by Bush on Campaign on Issue of Prison Fur-
loughs, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wsj File.
4. ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 10-12
(1987); THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE xi-xiii (Dean
J. Champion ed., 1989).
5. Peter H. King, That Grinding Sound, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1994, at Al, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Lat File.
6. See James Austin, "Three Strikes and You're Out": The Likely Consequences on the Courts,
Prisons, and Crime in California and Washington State, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 239, 245
(1994); Ilene M. Shinbein, "Three Strikes and You're Out": A Good Political Slogan to Reduce
Crime, but a Failure in its Application, 22 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 175, 199
(1996).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Sentencing Commission). Although Mistretta held there was no violation of the separation
of powers in vesting legislative power to the Sentencing Commission, subsequent to that case
"the judiciary has resented the encroachment on their powers of discretion and interpretation of
the law." Karen Lutjen, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETH-
ICS & PUB. POL'Y 389, 421 (1996).
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crusade in developing the most controversial and restrictive three
strikes sentencing law of any three strikes state.8 Until recently, Cali-
fornia's three strikes law effectively removed sentencing discretion
from the judiciary in sentencing second and third-time habitual felony
offenders, placing that discretion within the prosecutorial realm and
forcing a standoff between the judiciary and the legislature over sen-
tencing discretion.9 In the landmark case of People v. Superior Court
(Romero),1° the California Supreme Court unanimously held that sec-
tion 1385(a) of the California Penal Code permits a court to strike a
prior felony conviction in three strikes cases on its own motion, rather
than upon prosecutorial recommendation."'
The goal of this Comment is three-fold. First, this Comment pro-
vides a comprehensive understanding of the purpose and application
of three strikes laws. Second, this Comment highlights the various
policy concerns that are inescapably intertwined with three strikes
laws. Finally, the author advocates moving away from the retributivist
position on sentencing that has replaced the previous rehabilitative
model, and instead refocusing energies on a combined approach of
education, prevention, rehabilitation, and retribution. Part I discusses
the procedural machinations of the three strikes law itself, and fur-
ther, provides an introductory look into its application. For illustra-
tive purposes, the overview is followed by a brief discussion of the
application of similar three strikes laws in other leading three strikes
states. Having established the substance of California's three strikes
law and its function and application, the next section discusses the ra-
tionale and support behind the passage of such laws, including both
public and political views. The sources of opposition to such legisla-
tion are then examined. This opposition is broken down into six sepa-
rate arguments.
8. California tends to lead the way in developing new legislation. For example, three strikes
laws gained little attention until California's law was passed in 1994. Gregory W. O'Reilly,
Truth-in-Sentencing: Illinois Adds yet Another Layer of "Reform" to its Complicated Code of
Corrections, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 985, 996 (1996); see generally Lori L. Hanesworth, Are They
Graffiti Artists or Vandals? Should They Be Able or Caned?: A Look at the Latest Attempts to
Eradicate Graffiti, 6 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENTn. L. 225, 231 (1996) (noting that California
leads the way in the development of controversial caning legislation as punishment for graffiti
vandals); Keirsten L. Walsh, Safe and Sound at Last? Federalized Anti-Stalking Legislation in the
United States and Canada, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 373, 382-83 (1996) (highlighting California's lead-
ing role in the development of anti-stalking legislation in 1990, to which every state in this coun-
try, as well as Canada, has followed suit).
9. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f)(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998).
10. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
11. Id. at 629.
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After fully discussing California's three strikes law, the background
focuses on myriad sentencing laws in place throughout the country
that are directly aimed at punishing violent or habitual criminals to
identify the many sentencing options available to courts in punishing
habitual offenders. The Part then goes on to examine the chief
problems associated with California's three strikes law, considering at
length both the practical and theoretical problems arising as a result of
California's booming prison population. As a direct corollary to the
prison population problem, the many alternatives to incarceration as
punishment for nonviolent habitual criminals are discussed as meth-
ods which could invariably alleviate the crises that have enveloped
California's legal system.
Finally, the case of People v. Superior Court (Romero) and its po-
tential application of California's three strikes law is discussed. Noted
are the procedural history of the case, the legislation to the California
Supreme Court's holding, and the perceived impact on California's
legal process. Part II examines in great detail each of the background
points in one of two ways: (1) how the individual point is affected by
the use of California's three strikes law; or (2) how the individual
point would alleviate the problems and concerns caused by three
strikes laws. After an extensive examination of all of the previously
mentioned factors, Part III contains conclusions about three strikes
laws.
This Comment focuses on California's three strikes law, the incar-
ceration debacle, and other political and psychological sentencing is-
sues for two reasons. First, California tends to lead the nation in new
and innovative legislation and, as a result, could be highly influential
in the passage of more radical three strikes laws in other states. Sec-
ond, California's three strikes law is the most restrictive and contro-
versial of the three strikes laws currently in place.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of California's Three Strikes Legislation
Previously known as the Jones-Costa Three Strikes Bill, Section 667
of the California Penal Code was enacted as emergency legislation in
1994.12 The bill, initiated in response to the senseless murder of eight-
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667. The California Penal Code currently contains two similar provi-
sions regulating sentencing impositions for persons convicted of a felony, who have previously
committed one or more "violent" or "serious" felonies. Id. §§ 667, 1170.12. Because both stat-
utes are nearly identical, for purposes of this Comment, all references made to California's three
strikes legislation are to CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE section 667.
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een-year old Kimber Reynolds, 13 received little support in its early
stages. 14 However, the subsequent murder of twelve-year old Polly
Klaas was highly instrumental, 15 and essentially became the turning
point in obtaining the necessary signatures to add the bill to the Cali-
fornia ballot. 16 Use of the catchy baseball slogan, "Three strikes,
you're out!" has also played an influential role in the increased public
support of three strikes sentencing legislation.' 7 The myriad of policy
concerns behind three strikes legislation is not as simple as the base-
ball slogan may suggest, however.' 8 Section 667 of the California Pe-
nal Code was unquestionably aimed at enhancing mandatory
sentences for convicted criminals with a history of serious or violent
felony convictions.' 9 Furthermore, it was designed to provide a "no
13. Eighteen-year-old Kimber Reynolds was shot in the head during an attempted robbery of
her purse as she exited a local restaurant on June 30, 1992; she died two days later. Louis Gal-
van, A Tender Tribute to Daughter, FRESNO BEE, July 2, 1992, at Al, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Fresno File. Police believed Joseph Michael Davis, a career criminal with a history of
drug abuse, was linked to her death. Amy Alexander, Tower Neighborhood Mourns: Slaying
Suspect Had Violent History, FRESNO BEE, July 4, 1992, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Fresno File. Davis was subsequently shot and killed by police officers outside an apart-
ment complex. Id. A second suspect, Douglas David Walker was later linked to Reynolds'
murder as an accomplice. Royal Calkins, Victim's Family Urges Longer Prison Sentence, FRESNO
BEE, Dec. 3, 1992, at BI, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fresno File. Walker pled guilty to
lesser charges and was sentenced to nine years in prison on recommendation. Id.
14. George Skelton, A Father's Crusade Born from Pain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at A3,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Lat File. Mike Reynolds, Kimber's father, was the driving
force behind California's three strikes bill, targeted at career criminals. Id. Reynolds initially
had difficulty in obtaining enough signatures to add the bill to the California ballot. Jane Gross,
Many Shout, 'Three Strikes and You're Out': Repeat-Offender Action Draws Rush of Support,
SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Dec. 26, 1993, at A3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sdut File.
However, the necessary support was quickly forthcoming following the death of Polly Klaas. See
infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
15. TWelve-year-old Polly Klaas was abducted from her home at knife-point during a slumber
party on October 1, 1993. Police Find Body of Missing California Girl, STATE J.-REG., Dec. 5,
1993, at 42, available in LEXIS, News Library, Stjreg File. Her body was found two months later
in a wooded area approximately 30 miles from her home. Id.
16. Pamela J. Podger, Anger over Klaas Killing Generates Support for 'Three Strikes' Initiative,
FRESNO BEE, Dec. 7, 1993, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fresno File.
17. The phrase "three strikes, you're out" has been credited with attracting support to the
three strikes movement. Daniel M. Warner, Direct Democracy: The Right of the People to Make
Fools of Themselves, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 47, 100 n.172 (1995); see Peter J. Benekos & Alida
V. Merlo, Three Strikes, You're Out!: The Political Sentencing Game, FED. PROBATION, Mar.
1995, at 3; Michael G. Turner et al., "Three Strikes and You're Out" Legislation: A National
Assessment, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1995, at 16.
18. Marc Mauer, Politics, Crime Control... and Baseball?, 9 CRIM. JUST. 30, 64 (1994); see
'Three Strikes' Rule Works in Baseball, Not Criminal Justice, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Sept. 6,
1994, at A8, available in LEXIS, News Library, Austin File.
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998). ("It is the intent of the Legislature
in enacting subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, to ensure longer prison sentences and greater pun-
ishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or
violent felony offenses.")
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questions asked" policy in sentencing a career criminal to life impris-
onment for his or her third felony conviction.20 Although the intent of
the law may have been clear, the application of the law has been
highly criticized. 21
1. California Penal Code Section 667
Section 667 is actually a two-tiered plan aimed at penalizing the ha-
bitual criminal, focusing on both two and three-time convicted
felons.22 Section 667 only applies when the prior convictions are clas-
sified as one of the "serious" or "violent" felonies identified in the
statute.23 Both tiers of Section 667 require that the prosecuting attor-
20. Peter H. King, That Grinding Sound, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1994, at A3, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Lat File.
21. See Dan Bernstein, Democrats Jumping Off "3 Strikes" Train, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 18,
1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sacbee File (reporting on the development of the
three strikes law in California's legislature); William Claiborne, Study Finds Disparity in 'Three
Strikes' Law: Blacks in California Disproportionately Sentenced, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1996, at
A3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File (reporting that African-Americans are being
sentenced at a rate of thirteen to one over Caucasians under three strikes laws); Carl Ingram,
Serious Crime Falls in State's Major Cities, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at A3, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Lat File (citing a department of corrections study that indicates that 85% of
criminals sentenced under three strikes laws were sentenced on second and third offenses that
were nonviolent, and a Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice report which found that 43% of
three strikes inmates are African-American); Greg Krikorian, One Man's Battle With '3 Strikes',
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at B1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lat File (discussing allega-
tions that three strikes laws disproportionately sentence a higher rate of African-Americans);
Steve Lawrence, Two Senators Spar on '3 Strikes', FRESNO BEE, July 19, 1996, at A3, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Fresno File (discussing politicians' debate whether three strikes laws re-
sult in extremely harsh sentences for minor offenses).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE §667.
23. Id. § 667.5(c). This section describes with particularity those felonies considered
"violent":
(1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter.
(2) Mayhem.
(3) Rape as defined in paragraph (2) or (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 261 or para-
graph (1) or (4) of subdivision (a) of Section 262.
(4) Sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bod-
ily injury on the victim or another person.
(5) Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlaw-
ful bodily injury on the victim or another person.
(6) Lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years as defined in Section 288.
(7) Any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life.
(8) Any felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person other
than an accomplice which has been charged and proved as provided for in Section
12022.7 or 12022.9 on or after July 1, 1977, or as specified prior to July 1, 1977, in
Sections 213, 264, and 461, or any felony in which the defendant uses a firearm which
use has been charged and proved as provided in Section 12022.5, 12022.53, or 12022.55.
(9) Any robbery perpetrated in an inhabited dwelling house, vessel, as defined in Sec-
tion 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, which is inhabited and designed for
habitation, an inhabited floating home as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55
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of the Health and Safety Code, an inhabited trailer coach, as defined in the Vehicle
Code, or in the inhabited portion of any other building, wherein it is charged and
proved that the defendant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon, as provided
in subdivision (b) of Section 12022, in the commission of that robbery.
(10) Arson, in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 451.
(11) The offense defined in subdivision (a) of Section 289 where the act is accom-
plished against the victim's will by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate
and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.
(12) Attempted murder.
(13) A violation of Section 12308.
(14) Kidnapping, in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 207.
(15) Kidnapping, as punished in subdivision (b) of Section 208.
(16) Continuous sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Section 288.5.
(17) Carjacking, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 215, if it is charged and proved
that the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon as provided in subdi-
vision (b) of Section 12022 in the commission of the carjacking.
(18) Any robbery of the first degree punishable pursuant to subparagraph (a) of para-
graph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 213.
(19) A violation of Section 264.1.
Id. Section 1192.7(c) describes with particularity those felonies considered "serious":
(1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter; (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by force,
violence, duress, menace, threat of great bodily injury, or fear of immediate and unlaw-
ful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (5) oral copulation by force, violence,
duress, menace, threat of great bodily injury, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury on the victim or another person; (6) lewd or lascivious act on a child under the
age of 14 years; (7) any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison
for life; (8) any other felony in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily
injury on any person, other than an accomplice, or any felony in which the defendant
personally uses a firearm; (9) attempted murder; (10) assault with intent to commit
rape or robbery; (11) assault with a deadly weapon or instrument on a peace officer;
(12) assault by a life prisoner on a noninmate; (13) assault with a deadly weapon by an
inmate; (14) arson; (15) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to
injure; (16) exploding a destructive device or any explosive causing great bodily injury
or mayhem; (17) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to murder;
(18) burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, or trailer coach as defined by the Vehicle
Code, or inhabited portion of any other building; (19) robbery or bank robbery; (20)
kidnapping; (21) holding of a hostage by a person confined in a state prison; (22)
attempt to commit a felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for
life; (23) any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly
weapon; (24) selling, furnishing, administering, giving, or offering to sell, furnish, ad-
minister, or give to a minor any heroin, cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP), or any
methamphetamine-related drug, as described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of
Section 11055 of the Health and Safety Code, or any of the precursors of
methamphetamines, as described in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision
(f) of Section 11055 or subdivision (a) of Section 11100 of the Health and Safety Code;
(25) any violation of subdivision (a) of Section 289 where the act is accomplished
against the victim's will by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (26) grand theft involving a
firearm; (27) carjacking; any attempt to commit a crime listed in this subdivision other
than an assault; and (20) any conspiracy to commit an offense described in paragraph
(24) as it applies to Section 11370.4 of the Health and Safety Code where the defendant
conspirator was substantially involved in the planning, direction, or financing of the
underlying offense.
Id. § 1192.7(c).
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ney plead and prove each prior felony conviction.24 However, more
important to the purposes of this Comment, pursuant to Section 1385
of the California Penal Code,25 the prosecuting attorney may move to
dismiss or strike a prior felony conviction allegation in the furtherance
of justice.2 6 A prosecuting attorney may also strike a prior felony con-
viction on the basis of insufficient evidence.2 7 Upon such request of
the prosecution, and upon satisfactory showing, the court may dismiss
any prior felony convictions.2 8 However, the striking of a prior felony
conviction cannot be the basis for any plea bargain between the prose-
cutor and the accused felon.2 9
The first tier of Section 667 directly affects those convicted felons
who have one prior felony conviction on their record, regardless of
the jurisdiction in which the previous felony was committed.30 For
these second-time felony offenders, Section 667 mandates that a five-
year enhancement penalty be added to each sentence imposed for the
instant crime, whereby the sentence and the enhancement then run
consecutively. 31 If the current conviction encompasses more than one
crime, consecutive sentences and enhancements shall be imposed for
each conviction.32 For example, if an offender is convicted of both
armed robbery and murder as part of the same offense, he or she
would be sentenced consecutively for those crimes, and a ten-year en-
hancement penalty would be added to the sentence.
The second tier of Section 667 applies to convicted felons with two
or more serious or violent prior felony convictions.33 However, this
second provision differs distinctly from the first in the severity of the
sentence imposed for a third felony conviction. For the three-time
convicted felon, the sentence imposed results in an indeterminate life
24. Id. § 667(f)(1).
25. Id. § 1385.
26. Id. § 667(f)(2); see id. § 1385. Section 1385 states:
(a) The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the applica-
tion of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be
dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the
minutes. No dismissal shall be made for any cause which would be ground of demurrer
to the accusatory pleading.
(b) This section does not authorize a judge to strike any prior conviction of a serious
felony for purposes of enhancement of a sentence under Section 667.
Id. (emphasis added).
27. Id. § 1385.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 667(g).
30. Id. § 667(a)(1).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 667(c)(7).
33. Id. § 667.5.
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sentence.34 The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence is the
greater of three possibilities: 1) three times the sentence for the cur-
rent felony conviction; 2) state imprisonment for twenty-five years; or
3) the sentence as determined by the court for the instant conviction,
plus any applicable enhancements pursuant to Section 1170 of the
California Penal Code.35 At a minimum, the third-time convicted
felon can be assured of being sentenced to a term of twenty-five years
to life. However, because the statute calls for the greater penalty, the
third-time sentence often results in life imprisonment.
2. Application of Section 667
Lawmakers and citizens alike are becoming increasingly aware that
three strikes legislation is achieving its task of putting away career
criminals-those with prior serious or violent felony convictions. 36 At
the same time, it has become readily apparent that the majority of
repeat offenders being punished under the three strikes law are nonvi-
olent criminals.37 A 1996 California Department of Corrections re-
34. Id. § 667(e)(2)(a).
35. Id. § 667(e)(2)(i)-(iii). The legislative intent of this determinate sentencing law is to pro-
vide sentencing uniformity for like crimes, through fixing sentencing terms proportionate to the
seriousness of the offense, and thus overcoming sentencing disparity. Id. § 1170(a)(1).
36. See Janine DeFao, 'Three Strikes' Credited as Crime Hits 25-Year Low, SACRAMENTO BEE,
July 2, 1996, at B1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sacbee File (reporting that California
crime rates are the lowest in 25 years; Attorney General Dan Lungren attributes the drop in
large part to three strikes laws); Brad Gates, Law Enforcement Appreciates the Backup
Crimework of Wilson and Legislature to Increase Funding for Public Safety Deserves a Public
"Thank You," L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1996, at B7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lat File
(reporting that the Orange County, California crime rate has dropped six point nine percent
since "three strikes" was passed in 1994; however, because a reduction in crime does not validate
a solution, Governor Pete Wilson subsequently enacted laws which provide an extra $150 million
for additional police officers and programs for juvenile crime prevention); J. Harry Jones, Funds
Asked for Jail Construction, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB, Oct. 16, 1996, at A4, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Sdut File (stating that California crime rates continue to drop while jail
populations continue to rise; both factors attributed largely to "three strikes"). But see Karen
Brandon, California High Court Decimates 'Three Strikes' Law, CMI. TRIB., June 21, 1996, at 3
(indicating that crime rates are also dropping in states that do not have three strikes laws).
37. See Ingram, supra note 21, at 3 (citing a department of corrections study that indicates that
85% of criminals sentenced under three strikes law were nonviolent); Patience Milrod, Impact of
Three Strikes Draws Praise, Criticism, FRESNO BEE, Jan. 21, 1996, at B7, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Fresno File (reporting that the overwhelming majority of three strikes sentences
are the result of nonviolent or non-serious crimes). Some harsh, and popularly known examples
of three strikes convictions for nonviolent or serious crimes are: a Sacramento man received a
life sentence for stealing two packs of cigarettes; a San Bernardino man convicted of stealing one
slice of pizza received a life sentence; and a Santa Ana man burglarized a restaurant, stealing
only four cookies, and consequently received a sentence of 25 years. Nick DiSpoldo, Three-
Strikes Laws: Cruel & Unusual?, COMMONWEALTH, June 14, 1996, at 10-11; see Michael Bren-
nan, My Turn-A Case for Discretion, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 1995, at 18. But see "Three Strikes"
in Action, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 3, 1996, at B6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sacbee File
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port indicates that, of all criminals sentenced under three strikes laws,
fifteen percent are serving time for violent crimes, six percent are
serving time for serious crimes, and roughly eighty percent are serving
time for nonviolent crimes. 38 Furthermore, it was foreseeable that the
number of plea bargains entered into every year would be drastically
reduced as a result of the imposition of three strikes legislation-and
that probability has become reality. 39 The impact of three strikes laws
on the legal system created an influx of jury trial requests, as opposed
to the more efficient and less costly plea bargains.
40
B. Overview of Other Three Strikes States
While California's three strikes law is the basis of this Comment,
twenty-two states currently have some form of three strikes legislation
in place.41 Washington and Wisconsin are two other leading three
strikes states, although California's rate of incarceration under its
three strikes law far exceeds those of these states.42 The state
supreme courts in both Washington and Wisconsin have recently up-
(reporting that evidence is strong that the vast majority of those sentenced to life under "three
strikes" are dangerous career criminals, and possibly only 15% of criminals sentenced to life
under "three strikes" do not have a violent history).
38. See Ingram, supra note 21, at A3 (discussing a California Department of Corrections
report).
39. See Cyndee Fontana, "Three Strikes" Law is Bearing Down on Fresno Courts, FRESNO
BEE, Jan. 21, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fresno File.
40. Id. An estimated $169 million in extra costs has been spent in Los Angeles on criminal
court trials demanded by criminal defendants in lieu of less costly plea bargaining procedures.
Three Strikes Injustice, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Mar. 13, 1996, at 10A, available in 1996 WL 4982450.
It is estimated that the figure could jump to $300 million in 1997. Claiborne, supra note 21, at
A3.
41. Angie Cannon, 3-Strikes Laws Swing and Miss, Survey Indicates, DENV. POST, Sept. 10,
1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Dpost File. In 1993, Washington was the only
state to enact three strikes legislation. Id. In 1994, twelve states enacted three strikes legislation:
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. In 1995, nine states enacted three strikes leg-
islation: Arkansas, Florida, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah,
and Vermont. Id.
42. Id. As of 1996, California led three strikes states in number of convictions: 1,300 third
strike convictions, and approximately 14,000 second strike convictions. Id. Second to California
is Washington, with 63 convictions. Id. Wisconsin, known as a leading three strikes state, has
only one conviction. Id. While Wisconsin boasts merely one conviction, it is known as a leading
three strikes state because the Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently allowed the state's three
strikes legislation, Wis. STAT. § 939.62 (1995), to stand without review. See State v. Lindsey, 554
N.W.2d 215 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied, 555 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. 1996) (holding that Wiscon-
sin's three strikes law was not violative of the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment, the doctrine of separation of powers, or equal protection, and therefore it
passed constitutional muster).
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held three strikes legislation as passing constitutional muster.43 Addi-
tionally, in those states that have not enacted three strikes legislation,
there may exist a variety of forms of de facto three strikes legislation,
such as habitual offender legislation."
C. The Movement Toward Three Strikes Legislation
California's three strikes legislation was initiated in response to two
senseless murders committed by recidivists in 1992 and 1993. 45 How-
ever, the movement itself had been long in the making.46 Throughout
the country, many people lived in fear of rising crime rates, senseless
gang-related crimes, children carrying guns, crimes committed by re-
cidivists, and children being targeted by drug dealers. 47 The public
blamed sentencing procedures and judicial discretion for allowing vio-
lent criminals to walk free.48 As a result, judicial discretion has be-
come the target of legislative prerogative. In response to increasing
public pressures, state legislatures have focused increased attention on
limiting the role of judicial discretion in the sentencing of repeat of-
fenders. 49 The combination of public sentiment for "get tough poli-
43. State v. Thorne, 921 P.2d 514, 537 (Wash. 1996); Lindsey, 554 N.W.2d at 225 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1996). The Supreme Court of Washington upheld that state's three strikes statute, WASH.
REv. CODE § 9.92.090 (1994), as constitutional, finding in part that it did not violate the doctrine
of separation of powers, was not unconstitutionally vague, was not violative of equal protection,
was not cruel and unusual punishment, and did not violate the defendant's right to due process.
Thorne, 921 P.2d at 537; see supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text; see also State v. Rivers,
921 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1996) (holding sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole is
not cruel and unusual punishment for a second degree robbery charge of a persistent offender);
State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473 (Wash. 1996) (upholding a sentence of life imprisonment for
robbery under the three strikes law).
44. See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text. Furthermore, sentencing guidelines have
also been enacted which include penalty enhancements for repeat offenders. See infra note 135-
44.
45. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
46. See generally Sharon F. Griffin, War on Crime: One Community Wins, SAN DIEoo UNION
& TRIB., Dec. 18, 1991, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sdut File (reporting that the
public is tired of crime, fear, drugs, and gangs); Ron Harris, Violent Death is All Too Real for this
Generation's Children, KAN. CnY STAR, May 26, 1991, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Kcstar File (reporting on children, guns, and violence); Howard Kleinberg, Getting Tough on
Crime Can Have Bad Results, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dec. 29, 1993, at D7, available in 1993
WL 11721325 (reporting on public fear of street crimes); Chuck Lindell et al., The Spark of Fear,
AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 15, 1991, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Austin File
(reporting that multiple, unrelated, serious crimes cause an increase in the public's fear of
crime).
47. Lindell et al., supra note 46, at Al.
48. See Michael Perlstein, Justice System Outgunned in War on Crime, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, May 26, 1996, at A14, available in 1996 WL 6422712.
49. See generally Tbrner et al., supra note 17 (discussing legislative attempts to decrease the
role of judicial discretion in sentencing).
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cies" with the opportunity for political gain brought California and
other lawmakers closer to the passage of three strikes legislation.50
Adding fuel to the fire, the 1992 Presidential campaigns emphasized
that crime was one of the most pressing concerns on the minds of
constituents-platforms on crime led the way in presidential strata-
gem.51 In the 1994 State of the Union Address, President Clinton em-
braced the federal three strikes proposal.5 2 Furthermore, in his 1994
radio address, the President stated outright that "[o]ur citizens want
criminals to be punished," and that laws such as three strikes are a
tough way of meeting that goal directly.53 Subsequently, President
Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, the federal version of three strikes legislation,54 which im-
posed life imprisonment for a third violent felony conviction. 55 Many
states, including California, quickly followed suit in enacting three
strikes legislation.5 6 President Clinton has subsequently changed his
position on the application of three strikes laws, requesting modifica-
tions to narrow the scope of the Act's applicability.57 Although three
strikes laws have received strong support, they have also encountered
strong opposition.
D. Opposition to Three Strikes Legislation
Opponents of three strikes legislation advance three main argu-
ments. First, opponents contend that three strikes legislation man-
50. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
51. See Meddis, supra note 3, at A10 (stating that crime issues have always been an important
political angle of presidential elections).
52. Bill Clinton, The State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 1994), reprinted in Let Us Resolve to
Continue the Journey of Renewal, WASH. PosT, Jan. 26, 1994, at A12, available in 1994 WL
226800.
53. The President's Radio Address, WEEKLY COMp. PREs. Doc. 1493 (July 16, 1994).
54. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922).
55. 18 U.S.C § 3559(c) (1994). Section 3559(c) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person who is convicted in a court of the
United States of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced to imprisonment if-
(A) the person has been convicted (and those convictions have become final) on
separate prior occasions in a court of the United States or of a State of-
(i) 2 or more serious violent felonies; or
(ii) one or more serious violent felonies and one or more serious drug offenses; and
(B) each serious violent felony or serious drug offense used as a basis for sentencing
under this subsection, other than the first, was committed after the defendant's convic-
tion of the preceding serious violent felony or serious drug offense.
Id.
56. Cannon, supra note 41, at Al.
57. David Lauter, Clinton Qualifies His Support of 3 Strikes Measure, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1994, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lat File.
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dates disproportionate sentences.5 8 Second, they attack the propriety
of prohibiting judicial discretion in sentencing by requiring mandatory
sentencing for a broad range of crimes.5 9 Third, opponents argue that
three strikes legislation directly violates the separation of powers
doctrine.60
1. Disproportionate Sentencing
A majority of nonviolent criminal offenders have been sentenced
under three strikes laws to mandatory minimum prison sentences of
twenty-five years to life. 61 These nonviolent criminal offenders in-
clude both drug users and petty criminals.62 Opponents propound,
therefore, that three strikes laws render disproportionate, overly-
harsh penalties for nonviolent crimes. 63 Courts have found otherwise,
consistently holding that sentences rendered in accord with three
strikes laws are proportional and pass constitutional muster.64 Oppo-
nents also argue that three strikes laws sentence a disproportionate
number of minorities, specifically African-Americans. 65 Studies on
58. See Claiborne, supra note 21, at A3; Ingram, supra note 21, at A3. Opponents argue that
minorities, primarily African-Americans, are sentenced at a disproportionate rate to that of Cau-
casians. Id.
59. See Robert Heglin, A Flurry of Recidivist Legislation Means: "Three Strikes and You're
Out," 20 J. LEGIS. 213, 226 (1994); Steve Lawrence, Senate Panel Rejects Limits on Judges' Dis-
cretion in Three Strikes Cases, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERVICE, July 6, 1996, available in 1996
WL 5394765.
60. Turner et al., supra note 17, at 34. However, in the recent California Supreme Court case
of People v. Superior Court (Romero), the court held that section 667 of the CALIFORNIA PENAL
CODE, which prohibited judicial discretion in the sentencing phase of criminals convicted under
said section, was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers. 917 P.2d 628, 649 (Cal. 1996).
61. See Ingram, supra note 21, at A3; Krikorian, supra note 21, at B1; Lawrence, supra note
21, at A3; see also supra notes 37, 38 and accompanying text. In general, statistics indicate that
the overwhelming majority of criminals sentenced under three strikes laws have been convicted
for nonviolent crimes. See supra notes 37, 38.
62. See Marc Mauer, Three Strikes Policy is Just a Quick Fix Solution, CORRECTIONS TODAY,
July 1, 1996, at 23.
63. Heglin, supra note 59, at 255-56; Victor S. Sze, A Tale of Three Strikes: Slogan Triumphs
over Substance as Our Bumper Sticker Mentality Comes Home to Roost, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1047, 1067, 1096 (1995).
64. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265 (1980) (holding that imposition of a life
sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment); People v. Supe-
rior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 378 n.15 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that life imprison-
ment for third-time habitual felons was not disproportional).
65. Claiborne, supra note 21, at A3 (identifying a thirteen to one ratio of African-Americans
to Caucasians sentenced under three strikes laws); Ingram, supra note 21, at A3 (citing a Califor-
nia Department of Corrections study indicating that 85% of three strikes sentences are imposed
for nonviolent crimes, and that 43% of that number represents the number of African-American
inmates sentenced).
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this issue have elicited statistics validating the argument,66 but thus far
the claim of disproportionate sentencing has been unsuccessful in re-
versing any convictions imposed under three strikes laws. 67
2. Deprivation of Judicial Discretion in Sentencing Procedures
Judicial discretion has been a cornerstone of our democratic form of
government since the United States Constitution was first adopted,
identifying the legislative, executive and judicial branches. 68 In recent
years, however, legislatures have sought to deprive the judiciary of its
traditional discretionary powers. The deprivation of judicial discre-
tion can be seen, at a minimum, in the formation of sentencing com-
missions and mandatory sentencing guidelines, 69 and now in the form
of three strikes legislation as well. Opponents of three strikes legisla-
tion argue that removal of such discretionary powers is an improper
abuse of legislative authority.70 This argument focuses solely on the
propriety of removing judicial authority to tailor sentences to individ-
ual crimes. Opponents of three strikes laws believe that judicial dis-
cretion is a necessary aspect of sentencing, and ultimately serves a
variety of necessary functions. 71
3. Separation of Powers
As with the principle of judicial discretion, the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers has also held significant traditional importance as one
of the foundations of American government.72 Although innovative
approaches to defining the separation of powers continue to evolve,
73
historically, the Constitution has been read as dividing the first three
Articles into three defined branches-the legislative, executive, and
judicial-granting specific governmental powers to each branch.74
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, each branch is prohibited
66. Claiborne, supra note 21, at A3; Ingram, supra note 21, at A3.
67. See, e.g., People v. O'Roark, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 870 (Ct. App. 1996); People v. Ruiz, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 561 (Ct. App. 1996); Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 364.
68. U.S. CONST. arts. I-II.
69. See supra note 4; infra note 108.
70. Heglin, supra note 59, at 226.
71. Id. Judicial discretion is necessary to ensure proportionality of crimes to sentences and to
maintain a continuous flow of defendants through the criminal justice system, in order to pre-
vent backlog. See generally Honorable J. Anthony Kline, Comment: The Politicalization of
Crime, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1087 (1995) (advocating the necessity of judicial discretion).
72. See GORDON S. WOODS, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 152
(1969).
73. See Keith Werhan, Normalizing the Separation of Powers, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2681 (1996)
(proposing a methodolgy to settle separation of power disputes).
74. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
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from encroaching on the domain of another, or exercising the powers
of another.75 Several theories arise in support of the separation of
powers. 76 For the purposes of this Comment, the most applicable the-
ory reasons that legislators and executives are subject to political pres-
sures due to their status as elected officials, but because federal judges
are appointed, the judiciary can act as a check to prevent the legisla-
tive and executive branches from performing acts contrary to the will
of the people.77 Historically, the legislature has had the power to
make the laws, while discretion in sentencing has been a judicial func-
tion.78 However, the California legislature breached this long-stand-
ing tradition by tailoring a law that prohibited judicial discretion in
sentencing, and placed all discretionary power in charging and/or
striking prior felony convictions in the hands of the prosecutors, or
more generally, the elected officials of the state.79
Until recently, the California court system consistently denied chal-
lenges to three strikes laws on the grounds of the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers.80 However, in the 1995 case, People v. Romero,81
California Superior Court Judge William D. Mudd, over the prosecu-
tion's objection, struck the prior felony convictions of defendant Ro-
mero, charged with possession of a controlled substance. 82 This ruling
was in direct contravention of the intent of Section 667. 83 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court subsequently affirmed Judge Mudd's decision in
People v. Superior Court (Romero).84 As a result, California courts
now retain the discretion to strike felony convictions of defendants
eligible for sentencing under three strikes laws. This removes the sole
discretion in sentencing from the legislature and returns it to the judi-
cial realm, where it has historically been placed.
In addition to opponents' main arguments, three ancillary argu-
ments also arise. First, opponents contend that the costs associated
with jury trials and prison space for convicted felons sentenced as
75. U.S. CoNsr. arts. I-Il1.
76. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 31-38 (1994) (describing the
role of federal courts in the balance of powers among the federal branches).
77. Id. at 31-32.
78. Id. at 32.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., People v. O'Roark, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 870 (Ct. App. 1996); People v. Ruiz, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 561 (Ct. App. 1996); People v. Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Ct. App.
1995).
81. People v. Romero, No. SCD103345 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1994).
82. Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 364.
83. Id.
84. People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
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three strikes criminals are too excessive.85 Second, opponents pro-
pose that because three strikes candidates face such extreme penalties
for their crimes, those accused felons may react more violently when
faced with capture. 86 Finally, because of the extreme penalties in-
volved in second and third strike cases, three strikes felons are no
longer pleading out their cases. Instead, they are invoking their con-
stitutional rights to jury trials.87
4. Excessive Costs
While three strikes laws may be successful in ridding the streets of
some habitual criminals, the same cannot be said for the anticipated
cost-effectiveness of the law. Second and third-time felons facing sen-
tencing under three strikes laws are requesting jury trials more fre-
quently.88 The extremely harsh sentences mandated by three strikes
laws essentially force more accused criminals to take their chances at
trial, as opposed to pursuing the normative practice of plea bargain-
ing.89 The alternative of plea bargaining has no measurable value to
second and third-time felons because judges no longer retain discre-
tion to minimize or reduce the mandatory sentences. In essence, the
second or third-time felon has nothing to lose by demanding a jury
trial.90 The criminal justice system is, therefore, required to bear the
burden of both the court time 91 and the monetary costs necessary to
85. "Three Strikes" Law Clogs Courts, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 3, 1995, at A8 (discussing a RAND
Corporation study). It had been estimated that the city of Los Angeles would spend $78 million
on pending three strikes jury trials. Id. Six judges were transferred from the civil division to
ease the caseload burden. Id. It was estimated that it could cost the state of California $6.5
billion per year to enforce the three strikes law. Id. The California Department of Corrections
estimated 20 additional prisons will be required by the year 2000, at an average rising cost of $5.7
billion per year. PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT: ESTIMATED
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MANDATORY SENTENCING LAW 18 (1994); see New
Prisons Still on Wilson's 1995 Spending Plan Agenda, CAL. PUB. FIN., Oct. 31, 1994, at 1, avail-
able in 1994 WL 3871481. But see Joseph Sandoval, Three Strikes is Good Criminal Justice Policy,
CORRECTIONS TODAY, July 1, 1996, at 22 (reporting that the taxpayer's contribution toward state
costs of incarceration are low, costing approximately $23 per month for family incomes of
$41,000 per year).
86. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
87. Fontana, supra note 39, at Al.
88. Three-Strikes Laws Can Foul Up the Whole System, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 1995, at 10A




91. See Butterfield, infra note 99, at Al.
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provide criminal defendants their right to trial.92 That increased bur-
den is ultimately passed on to the public.93
As was the intent of the three strikes legislation,94 an extraordinary
number of second and third-time felons have been convicted under
these laws.95 The prison system has been barraged with felons who
are being sentenced to longer prison terms than those imposed prior
to the enactment of three strikes legislation. 96 As a result, increased
funds are also necessary to maintain the prison housing of those in-
mates, as opposed to less costly methods of punishment. 97 Like the
costs of criminal trials, costs of inmate housing are also passed on to
the public.98
5. Prosecutorial Backlog
The criminal justice system also bears the burden of the time costs
associated with the increased number of jury trial requests.99 Time
costs can be defined as time used by the prosecutors, defense attor-
neys, and the court itself in processing cases. The rapidly increasing
backlog in the California criminal courts has been attributed to the
increased number of jury trials resulting from three strikes legisla-
tion.100 The courts have been flooded with jury trial requests, over-
whelming both the district attorneys' offices and the court.101 The
result has been a delay in the speed with which cases are passed
through the criminal justice system. 10 2 The plea bargain, historically a
device for passing criminal cases quickly through the system, with
92. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
93. See Charles Oliver, Tough on Crime-or Taxpayers? California's Three Strikes Law Has a
Downside, INVESTORS Bus. DAILY, Apr; 26, 1995, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Invdly File.
94. The historical intent of CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE section 1170.12, was "to ensure longer
prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit 'a felony and have been previ-
ously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses." Cal. Proposition 184, § 2-4 (1994)
(codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998)).
95. Cannon, supra note 41, at Al (identifying that California has sentenced approximately
1,300 third strike felons and approximately 14,000 second strike felons under its three strikes
law).
96. See supra notes 94-95; infra note 97.
97. Claiborne, supra note 21, at A3 (estimating that an additional $300 million could be spent
in Los Angeles in 1997 for three strikes trials); Three Strikes Injustice, supra note 40, at 10A
(identifying that $169 million in extra costs was spent in the city of Los Angeles as a result of the
three strikes law).
98. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
99. Fox Butterfield, California's Courts Clogging Under its "Three Strikes" Law, N.Y. TIMES,
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minimal costs, has been rendered practically useless in three strikes
cases.10 3 In California, the increased number of jury trials has also
taken its tolls on the jury system, placing an unanticipated burden on
the jury pools available to the court system.1°4
6. Potential for Increased Levels of Violence
Opponents of three strikes legislation argue that, rather than de-
creasing levels of violence throughout the state, the legislation sparks
the contrary reaction. 10 5 Felons sentenced under three strikes laws
are guaranteed an extremely harsh penalty for their second or third
felony convictions. Thus, second or third felony offenders facing sen-
tencing, or even capture, under three strikes laws may react more vio-
lently or extremely than they would otherwise. 10 6 The theory is that
such felons will do whatever it takes to resist arrest by police officers,
or will threaten, injure, or kill witnesses who may testify against
them. 10 7 For example, in one instance, a man awaiting trial under a
three strikes law allegedly conspired with five people to blow up a
courthouse and other buildings in the hopes that his criminal records
would be destroyed, thereby circumventing his sentencing.10 8 In an-
other case, a man committed suicide to avoid being sentenced to life
imprisonment under a three strikes law.' 0 9 Thus, the intent to deter
criminals from committing crimes may in fact be backfiring. It has
been suggested that sentencing alternatives for punishing violent ha-
bitual criminals are available which may more effectively fulfill a de-
terrent effect than three strikes laws.
103. Id.
104. Arleen Jacobius, California Three-Strikes Law Gobbling up Jurors, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995,
at 29. If the jury pool is not expanded, some jurors may be required to serve as many as three
times a year. Id.
105. Heglin, supra note 59, at 226-27; see Meredith McCain, "Three Strikes and You're Out":
The Solution to the Repeat Offender Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97, 124 (1996) (stating
that offenders who have more to lose if arrested may act more aggressively toward police officers
and witnesses).
106. See supra note 105.
107. Id.
108. Ron Harris, 6 Arraigned in Series of Bombings in Vallejo, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB.,
Feb. 5, 1997, at A3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sdut File. Kevin Lee Robinson was
charged with narcotics possession, a felony. Id. Because Robinson also had prior felony convic-
tions for serious or violent crimes, he was eligible for sentencing under California's three strikes
law. Id. He conspired with and paid five other people to bomb the courthouse and other build-
ings, in the hopes of disrupting the court system, thereby destroying his court records and pre-
cluding a three strikes trial and sentencing. Id.
109. Meghan Hoyer, Fear of Prison Leads Man to Suicide, ORANGE CouNTY REG., Oct. 16,
1996, at B4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Ocreg File. Clinton James Warner was found
with a gunshot wound to his head. Id. A note in his backpack identified that he committed
suicide because he feared being sentenced to life imprisonment under the three strikes law. Id.
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E. Alternative Policies Used to Punish Violent Habitual Criminals
Across the United States, there are a variety of sentencing guide-
lines currently in place that are aimed directly at punishing the violent
or lifetime criminal. 110 Any of these guidelines may be as or more
effective than three strikes laws, without the debilitating complica-
tions associated with such laws. The following sections address
mandatory sentencing, habitual criminal acts, consecutive sentencing,
sentence enhancements, extended sentencing provisions, truth-in-sen-
tencing acts, and the use of aggravation and mitigation at sentencing.
These sentencing methods support the contention that three strikes
laws are an unnecessary layer of sentencing.
1. Mandatory Sentencing
At a bare minimum, all fifty states, including the District of Colum-
bia, have enacted mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines,
although the mandatory minimums themselves vary widely across the
country.1" Mandatory minimum sentences, as the title suggests, must
be imposed upon conviction."i 2 Under such mandatory minimum
laws, the judiciary may not use traditional discretionary powers to al-
leviate sentences, suspend sentences, or even impose probation. 113
Rather, the minimum penalty acts as a floor at which sentencing must
begin. Unlike the case with three strikes laws, the judiciary may use
its discretion to sentence convicted offenders, but only within the
range as proscribed by mandatory minimum and maximum sentences
pursuant to state statute.114
One difference among the states, however, is the level at which
mandatory minimum sentencing begins. For example, in California,
the mandatory minimum sentence for first degree murder is twenty-
five years imprisonment.115 While in Illinois, the mandatory minimum
sentence is twenty years." 6 Another difference among the states is
the list of crimes to which mandatory minimum sentences are applied.
110. See generally O'Reilly, supra note 8.
111. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESS.
MENT OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING 21-22 (1996) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE] (identifying
sentencing practices in the United States as of February 1994, as reported by each state).
112. See TAMASAK WICHARAYA, SIMPLE THEORY, HARD REALITY-THE IMPACT OF SEN-
TENCING REFORMS ON COURTS, PRISONS AND CRIME 51-52 (1995).
113. Id. at 52.
114. See id.
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (stating that the minimum sentence
for first degree murder is 25 years imprisonment, and the maximum sentence is the death
penalty).
116. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1 (West 1996) (stating that the minimum sentence for first
degree murder is 20 years imprisonment and that the maximum sentence is the death penalty).
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In California, drunk driving does not carry a mandatory minimum
penalty, while the converse is true in Illinois."1 7 In addition to
mandatory minimum sentencing policies, many states employ more
crime-specific sentencing policies.
2. Habitual Criminal Laws
Many states have implemented what are known as habitual criminal
laws as a way of dealing more harshly with repeat or career
criminals. 118 These habitual criminal laws are known as the original
three strikes laws. 119 They act as a de facto form of three strikes
laws.' 20 For example, while Illinois does not have a three strikes law
in place, it does have legislation known as the Habitual Criminal Act,
which is tailored to punish the habitual criminal more severely.' 21
Under this Act, a repeat offender convicted for his third Class X fel-
ony must be sentenced to life imprisonment.122 Class X felonies are
essentially restricted to serious violent offenses, such as rape, deviate
sexual assault, armed robbery, arson, or aggravated kidnaping for ran-
som. 123 Distinctly different from the California three strikes law, Illi-
nois requires that all three felony convictions be either murder or
Class X felonies, and the three felonies must have all occurred within
117. BUREAU OF JUSTICE, supra note 111, at 24-25.
'118. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
119. The first habitual criminal law was passed by Ohio in 1885. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 161 (1993); see 1885 Ohio Laws 236-237.
120. Warner, supra note 17, at 78 n.172 (noting that three strikes laws are unnecessary because
most states have habitual criminal statutes on the books).
121. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33B-1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997). The Habitual Criminal Act
states:
(a) Every person who has been twice convicted in any state or federal court of an
offense that contains the same elements as an offense now classified in Illinois as a
Class X felony, criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping or first degree murder,
and is thereafter convicted of a Class X felony, criminal sexual assault or first degree
murder, committed after the 2 prior convictions, shall be adjudged an habitual criminal.
(b) The 2 prior convictions need not have been for the same offense.
(c) Any convictions which result from or are connected with the same transaction, or
result from offenses committed at the same time, shall be counted for the purposes of
this Section as one conviction.
Id.
122. Marvin E. Aspen, New Class X Sentencing Law: An Analysis, 66 ILL. B.J. 344, 347 (1978);
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3(c)(7) (West 1996) ("When a defendant is adjudged a habitual crim-
inal ... the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment.").
123. Aspen, supra note 122, at 347. Class X felonies carry the statutory penalty of six to thirty
years imprisonment. Id.; see, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (drug induced homicide); id. 5/
18-2 (armed robbery); id. 5/33A-3 (armed violence); id. 5/10-2 (aggravating kidnaping); id. 5/12-
14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault); id. 5/30-1 (treason); id. 5/12-4.1 (heinous battery); id. 5/
20-1.1 (aggravated arson).
19981
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a twenty year period. 124 The range of penalties for sentencing under
habitual criminal laws can vary widely.125 For example, several other
non-three strikes states, such as Michigan and Kansas, have habitual
criminal legislation in which the punishment imposed is far less severe
than that of Illinois. 126
3. Consecutive Sentencing
Many states, such as Illinois, 127 Indiana, 128 and Michigan, 129 regu-
larly employ consecutive sentencing, which generally enables the judi-
ciary to sentence an offender to serve two consecutive sentences for
two convictions that are not part of a single course of conduct.1 30 The
Illinois legislature has expanded consecutive sentencing even fur-
ther.131 When a criminal has been convicted of a Class X or Class 1
felony, it is of no consequence whether the two convictions were part
of a single course of conduct. 132 If the court finds at least one of the
current offenses to be either a Class 1 or Class X felony, and the vic-
tim sustained severe injury, then the court has the discretion to im-
pose consecutive sentences for two convictions arising from a single
course of conduct. 133 Thus, in Illinois, criminals committing more seri-
ous felonies in which physical harm is a factor are punished more
harshly under consecutive sentencing. 134 However, regardless of
124. O'Reilly, supra note 8.
125. See supra notes 119-26.
126. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504(a)(1) (1995) (imposing a sentence of "not less than
the least, nor more than twice the greatest minimum sentence" after one or more prior felony
convictions), and MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 769.10-769.13 (1996) (providing that a felony offender's
sentence can be enhanced if he has previously been convicted of one or more felonies), with 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3(c)(7) (mandating life imprisonment for a defendant judged a habitual
criminal).
127. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-4.
128. IND. CODE § 35-47-10-9 (1996).
129. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 786.7(b).
130. A good representation of consecutive sentencing exists in California. California law pro-
vides that current, multiple convictions, that do not arise from a single course of conduct, must
result in consecutive sentencing; and any current sentences must be served consecutively with
any sentences currently in progress. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(6)-(8) (West 1988 & Supp.
1998).
131. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-4(a). This section states in pertinent part:
The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as
part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the
nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was





134. Aspen, supra note 122, at 345.
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whether the sentence imposed results from a single course of conduct,
the end result is a longer period of incarceration for those criminals
sentenced under consecutive sentencing statutes.
4. Sentence Enhancements and Extended Sentencing Provisions
Mandatory minimum guidelines can be boosted by the presence of
certain circumstances during the commission of a crime. 135 For exam-
ple, in Pennsylvania, if a convicted offender possessed a firearm dur-
ing the commission of his or her crime, the minimum floor at which
sentencing begins is raised by five years.136 Therefore, if a crime is
punishable by a minimum of five years incarceration, the convicted
criminal would be imprisoned for no less than ten years. Some states
also use the factor of bodily injury as an enhancement. 137 Sentence
enhancements are distinct from the use of aggravating factors at the
sentencing phase, because the enhancement penalty is imposed by
statute, and not by the judge. 138
Sentence enhancements are also different from extended sentencing
provisions. Extended sentencing provisions are generally imposed on
habitual criminals; they receive extended sentences based on previ-
ously committed serious or violent felonies. 139 These enhancement
factors are based solely on the criminal's prior criminal history, and
are completely separate from the crime at issue.140 In essence, those
criminals sentenced under extended sentencing statutes are being
punished for their prior criminal histories, as well as their current
convictions.141
5. Truth-in-Sentencing Acts
Truth-in-sentencing acts adopted by some states either abolish or
greatly restrict what have previously been known as "good time
135. See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that Pennsylvania's statu-
tory enactment of minimum "floors" at which sentencing shall begin, for enumerated crimes
involving visible possession of a firearm is not a constitutional violation of due process).
136. See id.
137. See Turner, supra note 17, at 61. According to the National Bureau of Justice Assistance,
Florida and Wisconsin consider degree of injury to be a penalty enhancement at the sentencing
stage. Id.
138. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 775.084 (1996); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-3 (West 1993 & Supp.
1997); Wis. STAT. § 939.624 (1996).
139. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501 (Michie 1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 775.08; N.J. STAT.
Ar. § 2C:43-6 (West 1996).
140. See O'Reilly, supra note 8, at 995 (stating that a judge may impose a harsher sentence




credit" policies. 142 Under good time credit policies, an inmate would
generally earn one day of early release for every day of good time
credit earned. 143 Several states have abolished or restricted good time
credit and adopted truth-in-sentencing laws.144 For example, Ari-
zona's stated purpose of the general provisions of its criminal code is
to "promote truth and accountability in sentencing.' 45
While Arizona's early release programs have been completely abol-
ished, other states' early release programs, such as those found in Illi-
nois, 46 have been severely restricted. In Illinois, there are four
categories of offenses determining early release for good time
credit. 147 Each of the four categories carries a specific percentage of
time an inmate must serve of his or her sentence. 148 For example,
under the first category, which contains solely the offense of first de-
gree murder, the convicted criminal must serve 100% of the prison
sentence imposed. 4 9 Previously, if sentenced to a twenty-five year
prison term, the convict theoretically could have been released in half
that time for good time credit earned. 50 Under the new truth-in-sen-
tencing law in Illinois, imposition of a twenty-five year prison term
means the inmate will serve 100% of that sentence, with no possibility
of early parole for good time.' 5' Truth-in-sentencing laws have been
enacted at the federal level as well. 152 Furthermore, the federal gov-
ernment has gone so far as to offer federal funding for the building of
prisons in those states that enact such laws in order to encourage the
passage of truth-in-sentencing laws.' 53
142. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 119, at 161.
143. Id. at 159-62. Policies for good time credits, however, may vary by state. Id.
144. At a minimum, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Tennessee, and Virginia have adopted "truth-in-sentencing" laws which
mandate that inmates serve at least 85% of their sentences. Donna Hunzeker, The 85% Solu-
tion, 21 STATE LEGISLATURES, Sept. 1, 1995, at 11.
145. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-101(7) (1995).
146. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3 (West 1996). For example, good-time credit is no longer
available to a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment for first degree murder. See id.
147. Id. 5/3-6-3(a); see O'Reilly, supra note 8, at 1014-15 (delineating four categories of of-
fenses which determine the length of prison time an inmate must serve: murder, certain violent
crimes, those requiring judicial discretion, and those that remain eligible for good time credit).
148. O'Reily, supra note 8, at 1014-15. The crime of murder receives a 100% sentence; the
category of certain violent crimes requires that 85% of the sentence be served; the judicial dis-
cretion category requires that 50% of the sentence be served. Id.
149. Id.
150. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-6-3 (1992).
151. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(a).
152. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
153. Id.
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6. Aggravation and Mitigation Hearings
One of the most simplistic enhancements of sentencing terms oper-
ates in the form of aggravation and mitigation hearings. After an ac-
cused has been convicted of a crime, a sentencing judge may consider
both aggravating and mitigating factors at a defendant's sentencing
hearing. Any relevant information, including "victim impact" state-
ments, can be introduced at these hearings, except for the victim's
opinions of the defendant and his or her crime, or the victim's charac-
ter.154 Therefore, while the crime may attach mandatory minimum
penalties, the sentencing judge retains the discretion to enhance that
penalty based on the weight of the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances presented at the sentencing hearing. 155 Although mitigating
factors must also be considered by the judge in determining any pen-
alty enhancement, minimum sentences may ultimately be enhanced to
effectively remove the dangerous or violent criminal from the streets.
So long as the maximum sentences are not surpassed, the judge re-
tains the discretion to enhance any minimum sentence. However, use
of this and the other various sentence enhancing procedures have con-
tributed in part to what may be termed an "incarceration crisis."
F. The Incarceration Crisis in America
The number of convicted felons being sentenced to longer prison
terms is rising at an alarming rate. 156 As new "get tough on crime"
policies are implemented, the populations of targeted prisons meant
to house those felons are expanding rapidly. 157 The results of this bur-
geoning population are evident in several respects. First, prison con-
ditions have deteriorated so dramatically that state and federal prison
systems have often been the target of court-ordered reform. 15 Sec-
ond, in response to the overpopulation crisis, the number of prisons
154. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (holding that the Eight Amendment is
not a per se bar to consideration of "victim impact" evidence, therefore "victim impact" evi-
dence is admissible at sentencing hearings, except for that evidence which represents any per-
son's opinion of the defendant or the nature of his crime).
155. See id.
156. TODD R. CLEAR, HARM IN AMERICAN PENOLOGY: OFFENDERS, VICTIMS, AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES 45 (1994). In the United States, between 1973 and 1990, the incarceration rate
per 100,000 people increased an incredible 205%. Id.; see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
157. Paula Mergenhagen, The Prison Population Bomb, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Feb. 1, 1996, at
36, 38. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the number of state and federal inmates
jumped from 319,600 in 1980, to 999,800 in 1994. Id. At the same time, the country's population
increased at a non-commensurate rate of 15%. Id.




constructed each year continues to rise correspondingly. 159 Third, the
state and the taxpayer bear the costs of supporting the rising number
of convicted felons sent to prison for extended terms.160 Fourth, re-
gardless of the intent of enhanced sentencing provisions, research in-
dicates that a large number of violent criminals are being released or
paroled each year to make room for the larger number of nonviolent
criminals being sentenced under enhanced sentencing provisions. 161
Finally, overpopulation can have adverse psychological effects on
those prisoners incarcerated for nonviolent crimes which may, in turn,
ultimately play a role in the rate of recidivism. 62
1. Court-Ordered Reform
Prison overcrowding is rampant throughout the country, and the
quality of penal facilities has dropped accordingly. 63 The federal
courts have often found it necessary to step into the arena of manag-
ing prison facilities, traditionally an area of expertise left to state gov-
ernments, 164 and issue broad orders of reform.' 65 At least forty states
have been the target of court reform seeking to either end overpopu-
lation or improve prison conditions as a whole. 166 Oftentimes, the
court has left orders in place for extensive periods of time to ensure
159. Editorial, The Prison Sell, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 14, 1996, at B6, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Ocreg File. The number of adult prison facilities either in operation or
under construction, increased 29% in 1995, from 49,154 to 63,595 facilities; private prisons saw a
corresponding 15% increase from 88 to 104 facilities. Id; see Mark Katches, $1.65 Billion Tagged
to Build Six Prisons, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 1996, at N1, available in 1996 WL 6542586
(reporting that the California prison population is'growing by approximately 11.8% yearly, and
it is projected that, by tile year 2005, 18 new California prison facilities will be required).
160. Dan Morain, Legislators Maneuver on Prison Bond Issue, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1996, at
A3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lat File; see David B. Lamb, Main Street Finds Gold in
Urban Crime Wave, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lat File
(reporting that states divert funds from other state programs for prison funding). California's
Governor Wilson has sought state approval for the construction of six additional prisons, but has
met opposition from legislators who contend that prison spending, which accounts for eight and
one-half percent of the state's budget, diverts money from other state programs. Id.
161. David B. Kopel, Sentencing Policies Endanger Public Safety, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 1995,
at 64.
162. See also Patrick Kinkade et al., The Consequences of Jail Crowding, CRIME & DELINO.,
Jan. 1995, at 150-61 (discussing research findings of jail crowding which indicate jail crowding
attributes to inmate violence and mental problems); see generally PAULA B. PAULUS, PRISON
OVERCROWDING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1988) (detailing problems of overcrowding
and its promotion of psychological problems and criminal behavior).
163. See WELSH, supra note 158, at 7; Kinkade, supra note 162, at 150.
164. WELSH, supra note 158, at 10; Kinkade, supra note 162, at 150.
165. WELSH, supra note 158, at 7-13 (indicating that overcrowding and poor prison conditions
have lead to prison litigation, which subsequently lead to prison reform).
166. See id. at 4.
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that the facilities do not revert to their previous conditions. 167 As a
result of such judicial intervention, Congress passed the Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1994, greatly limiting this intervention into prison
issues by restricting inmate lawsuits. 168 The Act also authorizes af-
fected states to stay federal orders currently in place. 169 One method
of alleviating such overcrowding and substandard prison conditions
has been to build new prison facilities.
2. New Prisons
The primary method of handling the incarceration crisis has been to
expand the number of prisons available to accomodate felons.170 In
recent years, the number of prisons built in the United States has con-
tinued to escalate.' 7 ' This increase has turned the spotlight on spend-
ing and management."72 State officials have begun to turn away from
the historically state-managed facilities in favor of privately-run pris-
ons. 73 Private prisons are becoming increasingly more attractive be-
cause of the efficiency of private management. 174
The opposition to t he privatized prisons-for-profit focuses on moral
and ethical considerations. 175 California currently diverts funds from
its state budget in order to pay private institutions to house and man-
167. Chris Olert, Federal Judge KO's 17-year-old Consent Decree in City Jails, ASSOCIATED
PRESS POL. SERV., July 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5395910. For example, a New York court
order to improve conditions in city jails remained in effect for 18 years. Id. Similarly, a Texas
court order regulating brutality and overcrowding remained in place for 24 years. Deborah
Tedford, Prison Reform is Challenged, Hous. CHRON., May 30, 1996, at A23, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Achron File.
168. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
169. Id. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a state can petition the court for review of
remedial orders previously in place to control confinement conditions. Paul A. Crotty, Should
Prison Consent Decrees Be Vacated?, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 22, 1996, at 2. If no unconditional condi-
tions remain at that time, the order will be lifted. Id. For example, pursuant to the Act, the
Attorney General of California has requested termination of a court order regulating that state's
treatment of inmates with serious mental disorders, which the court had previously found to be
cruel and unusual. Danny Walsh, Two State Cases Test Legitimacy of Prison Reform Law, SAC-
RAMENTO BEE, June 18, 1996, at A4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sacbee File.
170. See David Shichor & Dale K. Sechrest, Quick Fixes in Corrections: Reconsidering Private
and For-Profit Facilities, 75 PRISON J. 457, 458 (1995) (identifying that the prison population
increase led to prison overcrowding, in turn resulting in court ordered reform, and subsequent
prison construction).
171. See CLEAR, supra note 156, at 45.
172. See supra notes 158-60.
173. DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT 13-14 (1995); see Shichor & Sechrest, supra
note 170, at 457.
174. See supra note 173.
175. See infra notes 177-81.
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age state criminals. 176 As a result, the shares of some corporate mem-
bers of the private prison industry are now traded on the stock
market, 177 turning prison management into a profitable business for
its investors.178 Opponents contend that the government should not
encourage the privatization of prisons.179 The fear is that, because pri-
vate prisons have become profit-turning businesses, there will be a
separate movement by private prison lobbyists toward increasing min-
imum and maximum penalties for criminals. 180 From a safety stand-
point, private prisons are reported to have a higher rate of convict
escapes than that of the publicly managed prison institutions.'18
In contrast to these criticisms, politicians view the privatization of
prisons as having a positive impact on the prison system in general. 182
Proponents contend that because the business element exists, there is
more incentive for the prison itself to meet certain standards, 83 ratio-
nalizing that without a profit incentive, prisons may fall below stan-
dards, inevitably contributing to prison unrest and violence.' 84
176. See supra note 161.
177. See Stock Tips, TuLSA WORLD, June 9, 1996, at E4, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Tlswld File (identifying that Wackenhut Corrections maintains a New York Stock Exchange
Symbol of WHC); Michael Schuman, A Surefire Growth Business, FORBES, Jan. 16, 1995, at 81
(reporting that Esmor Correctional Services is a public company listed on the NASDAQ); see
also David Shichor & Dale K. Sechrest, Delegating Prison Operations to Public or Private Enti-
ties, CORRECrIONs TODAY, Oct. 1, 1996, at 112 (identifying that an increasing number of private
prison companies are found in the stock market).
178. See Schuman, supra note 177, at 82. Occupancy rates of private prisons are at 98% of
Esmor Correctional Services Inc. Id. Esmor earned $1.5 million in profits from $23 million in
revenues in 1994. Id.; see also Stock Tips, supra note 177, at E4 (stating that "the prison industry
is a constant growth industry," with Wackenhut revenues growing 21% in 1995).
179. SHICHOR, supra note 173, at 45. Theoretical issues arise in privatizing prison manage-
ment, namely "the delegation of coercive power, public and private domains in punishment, and
punishment and profits." Id.
180. Id. at 158. A leading contention of opponents is that private prison institutions will seek
to protect their vested interests in filling their facilities to capacity, thereby ensuring higher prof-
its. Id.
181. See Kathy Walt & Polly Ross Hughes, Private Prison Boom, Gloom; Security, Legal
Loopholes Pressing Problems, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 1, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Hcron File (explaining how private prisons have greater security problems than public
prisons because they do not have to adhere to the same regulations).
182. See Thomas Clouse, Idaho Aims Toward Private Prisons, IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 5,
1997, at IA, available in LEXIS, News Library, Idstmm File (stating that "[riesearchers, correc-
tion officials and people in the industry" are in agreement that private prisons are generally
more cost efficient than public institutions, and are managed better than state facilities as well).
But see Shichor & Sechrest, supra note 170, at 459-61 (reporting that differences between state
and private prison facilities, in both costs and quality, are minimal at best).
183. SHICHOR, supra note 173, at 115-16. The possibility of receiving longer contracts may
encourage long-term commitment to the improvement of facilities and services. Id.; see Shichor
& Sechrest, supra note 170, at 462.
184. Cf. SHICHOR, supra note 173, at 115-16 (inferring that since incentives encourage im-
provement of facilities and services, if such incentives were absent, the converse would be true).
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3. Taxpayers' Prisons Costs
While the public demands tougher sentencing for criminals, they
may not be aware of the actual costs of prisons they must bear.185
Initially, funds must be diverted from other areas of a state's budget to
compensate for the rising need for additional prisons.18 6 In the alter-
native, the costs must be passed on to the taxpayers. At least 1,300
criminals have been convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years to
life under California's three strikes law. 187 Prison costs per inmate
vary from state to state, and from public to private institution-rang-
ing from approximately $14,000 to $23,000 annually.188 These figures
represent only prison housing costs, and do not include litigation
costs. 189 People v. Superior Court (Romero)190 may provide an oppor-
tunity for the judiciary to alleviate the prison overcrowding problem,
and act as a check on the legislature. Without such a check, it is possi-
ble that the rate at which criminals are sentenced under three strikes
laws will continue to increase. For each new criminal convicted under
three strikes laws, taxpayers will be responsible for a portion of his or
her upkeep.
4. The Release of Violent Criminals
While new prisons are constantly being constructed, this alone can-
not alleviate the problem of overpopulation. One alternative response
Because private prisons may fall below standards in the absence of incentives, state governments
should consider penalties for a private prison's performance failure. Id. at 115.
185. Cf. Three Strikes and You're Out, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Sept. 21, 1995, at A12, available
in 1995 WL 5076732 (stating that both lawmakers and the public, in general, should be aware of
the ramifications associated with longer prison sentences, including limitations on funding,
thereby requiring diversion of funds from other state programs).
186. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. In California, funds for building and operat-
ing prisons are being taken from state higher education programs. Dan Walters, Battle Between
Education and Prisons, FRESNo BEE, June 13, 1996, at A3, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Fresno File.
187. See Cannon, supra note 41, at Al.
188. Rick Orlov, State Spending Favors Prisons: Higher Education Taking a Hit Report Says,
L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 24, 1996, at N4, available in 1996 WL 6578589. In California, it costs
$21,375 per year, per inmate, to house a prisoner. Id. In Tennessee, it costs approximately
$35.39 per day to house an inmate at a private prison, and approximately $34.90 to $35.45 per
day to house an inmate at a state prison. Mike Mclntire, State Prison Costs Down, Clouding
Privatization Issue, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 12, 1997, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Htcour File. Inmate housing in Oregon costs approximately $23,000 per year. Leslie
Helm, Factories with Fences, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1997, at Dl. Michigan's private prison, managed
by United Correctional, costs approximately $43.66 per day, per inmate. Jeffrey Savitskie, Mich-
igan Prisons Turn to Managed Care, DET. NEWS, Dec. 31, 1996, at Cl.
189. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
190. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
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has been the early release of criminals,191 many of whom were incar-
cerated for serious or violent crimes. 192 The convicted persons taking
their place are primarily nonviolent felons. 193 Three strikes laws were
a response to public demand for safety from violent criminals, yet
some states, including California, are granting early release to some
violent criminals as one method of combatting the prison overpopula-
tion problem. 194
5. Psychological Consequences of Prison Overcrowding
Prison overcrowding has been directly linked to prison violence. 195
Increased incidents of convicts' misconduct toward fellow inmates or
prison staff can be attributed to prison overcrowding. 196 This miscon-
duct can include assaultive or disruptive behavior. 197 A second psy-
chological consequence has been noted in those released or paroled
criminals who become recidivists. Research has shown that tenden-
cies toward recidivism have been attributed in part to instances of
prison overcrowding and increased violence. 198 Furthermore, many
criminals sentenced to extended prison terms are nonviolent offenders
who are affected by overcrowding. 199 As a result of being subjected to
the violent atmosphere of a prison, these nonviolent criminals may
take on violent qualities upon their release that were not present prior
191. Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Deter-
minate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 112 n.264 (1993); Nkechi Taifa, "Three-Strikes-
And-You're-Out"--Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv.
717, 722 (1995).
192. Chi Chi Sileo, Crime Fighters Get Streetwise, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Feb. 5, 1996, at 8; see
It's Time to Rewrite the Three Strikes Law, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 18, 1996, at 8, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Sfchrn File (discussing California's policy of releasing inmates early to allow hous-
ing of convicts sentenced under the three strikes law).
193. Chi Chi Sileo, Are Three Strikes Laws Handcuffing the Courts?, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS,
Mar. 13, 1995, at 14 (citing a study identifying that violent criminals sentenced prior to three
strikes laws have been released after serving approximately one-third of their sentences, as a
means of making room for nonviolent three strikes convicts).
194. Id.; see Kopel, supra note 161, at 64 (stating that, in order to sentence nonviolent drug-
related criminals, the criminal justice system, in the face of prison overcrowding, is unable to
protect the public, releasing violent recidivists, or never charging them in the first place).
195. See Jeff Potts, American Penal Institutions and Two Alternative Proposals for Punishment,
34 S. TEX. L. REV. 443, 462-66 (1993) (stating that overcrowded conditions in prisons contribute
to higher rates of physical violence). But see Jeff Bleich, The Politics of Prison Crowding, 77
CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1145-46 (1989) (stating that although prison overcrowding bears some rela-
tionship to increases in prison violence, there is no exclusive causal link).
196. PAULUS, supra note 162, at 15. Most archival studies, based on prison record data, have
focused directly on the relationship between overcrowding and social misconduct. Id.
197. Id.; see Kinkade, supra note 162, at 150-61.
198. Potts, supra note 195, at 458-60.
199. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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to serving their prison sentences.2°° Thus, being incarcerated may
turn a nonviolent person into a violent person,201 which intuitively
runs contrary to the purposes of incarceration and does so in the face
of viable alternatives.
a. Retribution as Punishment
As recently as the early 1970s, sentencing procedures focused on
rehabilitation of offenders. 20 2 The focus of rehabilitation has been re-
placed by the perceived need for retribution,20 3 primarily due to a be-
lief that rehabilitation of criminals was impossible.2°4 The retribution
model became an attractive replacement for politicians, mainly be-
cause it provided an opportunity to replace the "soft on crime" model
with the "get tough on crime" model.20 5 Sentencing became essen-
tially political and, as a result, many states created sentencing commis-
sions for the sole purpose of developing structured sentencing
guidelines.20 6 Opponents of the retributive model of punishment,
however, advocate a return to the rehabilitative model.207
b. Lack of Funds for Prison Rehabilitation Programs
In past years, funding was also provided for rehabilitative programs
such as education and vocational training.20 8 However, due to the un-
precedented increase in the number of persons being sentenced to ex-
200. Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1036 (1991) (find-
ing that failure to remove low-risk inmates from extended prison conditions may increase rates
of recidivism); see Commentary, Not All Drug Users Deserve a Prison Term, TAMPA TRIB., Mar.
31, 1996, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Tamtrb File (stating that drug users should be
placed in rehabilitative centers rather than prisons); Misti Snow, Looking Into the Eyes of a
Killer, STAR TRIB. (MINN.-ST. PAUL), July 8, 1996, at 7A, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (relying on psychological studies by psychiatrist James Gilligan).
201. See supra note 200.
202. Stephen D. Sowle, A Regime of Social Death: Criminal Punishment in the Age of Prisons,
21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 497, 498 (1994-95). Until the early 1970's, the rehabilitative
model of punishment was employed in prisons throughout the country. Id.
203. Id. at 498-500.
204. Id.; see Michael Welch., Rehabilitation; Holding Its Ground in Corrections, FED. PROBA-
TION, Dec. 1995, at 3, 5 (citing a 1975 Lipton, Martinson & Wilks Study which found essentially
that prison rehabilitation is ineffective); see also LYNN GOODSTEIN & DORIS LAYTON MACKEN-
ZIE, THE AMERICAN PRISON: ISSUES IN RESEARCH AND POLICY 14-15 (1989) (explaining how
the public became skeptical of rehabilitation efforts due to the release of various evaluations of
corrective treatment).
205. GOODSTEIN & MACKENZIE, supra note 204, at 14-15.
206. Id. at 16-17.
207. See Honorable Richard Lowell Nygaard, The Myth of Punishment: Is American Penology
Ready for the 21st Century?, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (1995); see generally LOIS G. FORER, A
RAGE TO PUNISH (1994) (advocating a shift away from retribution and a return to
rehabilitation).
208. Welch, supra note 204, at 3, 5.
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tended prison terms, funds are no longer available for such
rehabilitative programs. 20 9 The discontinuation of previous rehabilita-
tive penal procedures has been linked to past, current, and anticipated
future rates of recidivism.210 Studies have shown that because ex-
convicts are released from prison with no education or marketable
skills, they feel forced to return to lives of crime. 211. While the time
spent in prison is indeed punishment, it is unproductive punishment,
returning the released criminal to society in the same, if not worse,
position as when the crime was committed.212 To avoid these inevita-
ble circumstances, attention should be returned toward the rehabilita-
tion of nonviolent criminals through alternative sentencing methods.
G. Alternative Sentencing Procedures for Rehabilitating Nonviolent
Criminals
A variety of sentencing procedures exist as alternatives to long or
short-term incarceration for nonviolent criminals. First, a judge may
impose monetary penalties, restitution, mediation, or even community
service as a means of rehabilitative punishment.21 3 Additionally, tech-
nological advances have resulted in alternative sentencing procedures
known as electronic monitoring.2 14 Intensive supervision offers yet
another alternative method of sentencing to incarceiation.215 Finally,
day reporting centers and correctional boot camps have become popu-
lar alternative sentencing procedures. 216
1. Monetary Penalties, Restitution, Mediation & Community Service
At the lowest end of the sentencing spectrum, judges often retain
the discretion to impose monetary penalties, restitution, mediation, or
community service as punishment for less serious or nonviolent
209. Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Reform, U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUND-
TABLE 391, 410 (1995) (advocating the use of intermediate sanctions as opposed to retributive
sentencing for nonviolent criminals).
210. Snow, supra note 200, at 7A.
211. Contra Snow, supra note 200, at 7A (identifying a Massachusetts study of 200 inmates
who earned college degrees while imprisoned and were subsequently released-none of those
200 released inmates have committed subsequent crimes).
212. See generally Lynne Goodstein, Inmate Adjustment to Prison and the Transition to Com-
munity Life, 16 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 246 (1979) (proposing that when an inmate has been
incarcerated and has adapted to a prison environment, he is much less likely to be able to adapt
as a productive member of society upon his release from that prison environment).
213. See infra notes 218-48.
214. See infra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
215. See infra notes 258-71 and accompanying text.
216. See infra notes 272-88 and accompanying text.
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crimes.217 In the past, a judge might impose one of these four penal-
ties, in combination with probation, or alone. However, with the rise
of mandatory minimum sentencing policies, the category of crimes
one of these alternatives may be applied to has markedly narrowed. 218
Monetary penalties are an attractive alternative to incarceration for
a variety of reasons. They are punitive, easily administered, provide
collection funds or victim compensation, and act as a deterrent pun-
ishment.2 19 Four states have enacted pilot monetary penalty schemes
known as "day fines" as sentencing alternatives. 220 These pilot
schemes are based upon a successful New York day fine program that
has been operating since 1988.221 Day fines are generally imposed in
conjunction with probationary sentences.222 Upon being selected to
participate in the program, the offender's daily income is calculated, a
fine amount is derived, a contract is signed, and a repayment schedule
is developed.2 23 Analysis of the New York day fine program indicates
that seventy percent of the offenders participating in the program
have paid their fines in full, and thirteen percent have had their
sentences revoked. 22 Relatively little coercion was required to
217. See generally Mark William Bakker, Repairing the Breach and Reconciling the Discor-
dant: Mediation in the Criminal Justice System, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1994) (discussing alterna-
tive methods of dispute resolution, including arbitration, mediation, and settlement); Dora L.
McNew, An Introduction to Community Corrections, 11 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 31 (1990)
(advocating the use of rehabilitative alternative sentencing procedures); Harry Mika, The Prac-
tice and Prospect of Victim-Offender Programs, 46 SMU L. REV. 2191 (1993) (exploring alterna-
tive sentencing procedures as responses to crime, as opposed to conventional incarceration).
218. Cf Heather McTavish, Profile: Janet Reno's Approach to Criminal Justice, 4 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 113, 115 (1993) (supporting the U.S. Sentencing Commission, American Bar As-
sociation, and judges who criticize mandatory minimum sentences as unfair in preventing judicial
discretion in tailoring sentences to the crime and the criminal); David Yellen, What Juvenile
Court Abolitionists Can Learn from the Failure of Sentencing Reform, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 577, 587
(identifying that the judiciary is prevented from determining an appropriate sentence based on
specific circumstances surrounding a crime, because it is forced to impose unfair and dispropor-
tionate sentences as required tinder mandatory minimum sentencing laws).
219. Sally T. Hillsman, Day Fines, in INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 19
(Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995); see supra note 212 and accompanying text.
220. Susan Turner, Day-Fine Projects Launched in Four Jurisdictions, in INTERMEDIATE SANC-
TIONS IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 26, 27 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995). Arizona,
Iowa, Connecticut, and Oregon have employed pilot day-fine programs which are funded by the
Bureau of Justice Assistance. Id. at 26-30. Each state's plan varies in organization and applica-
tion, although some general characteristics are common to all four states. Id. For example, each
state determines whether an offender is eligible for the program, and uses day-fine officers to
track offender compliance. Id.
221. Sally T. Hillsman, Day Fines in New York, in INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN OVER-
CROWDED TIMES 21, 26 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995).
222. Turner, supra note 220, at 26-30.
223. Id. at 27.
224. Hillsman, supra note 221, at 24-26.
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achieve this level of compliance, indicating that day fines may present
an effective intermediate sentencing alternative. 225
The alternative sanction of restitution requires an offender to reim-
burse a victim for his or her losses. 226 Restitution acts as compensa-
tion for a victim's loss. 227 It forces an offender to focus on the wrong
he or she has committed and its consequences. 228 For the state, it is an
efficient method of punishing a nonviolent or first-time offender.229
Restitution is invariably used in connection with another alterative to
incarceration such as probation, and is rarely used as a sole alternative
to imprisonment.230
Several downsides to restitution programs have been reported,
however. First, some studies contend that restitution programs are
applied discriminatorily, favoring white and middle-class criminals.231
Second, there is no conclusive information tending to show that resti-
tution positively affects recidivism. 232 Finally, restitution programs
are difficult to plan and implement.233 As a result, it is difficult to
gauge their results.
Mediation, like fines and restitution, focuses on the punitive nature
of criminal sentencing.234 Like restitution, mediation is usually im-
posed concurrently with another form of alternative sentencing. 235
However, in some cases, successful mediation between the offender
and his victim will negate any further sentencing.236 Mediation forces
an offender to be confronted by his victim-a role reversal centered
on power. In the mediation setting, the victim is in control and the
offender assumes a passive role.237 Theoretically, this puts the of-
fender in an uncomfortable position, which acts as a punishment by
forcing the offender to face his or her victim. 238 At the end of the
mediation process, the parties discuss the crime and other concerns,
225. Id. at 26.
226. Elmar Weitekamp, Restitution, in INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN OVERCROWDED TIMES
63, 63-64 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995).





232. Id. at 65.
233. Id.
234. Mark S. Umbreit, Mediating Conflict Among Victims and Offenders, in INTERMEDIATE
SANCTIONS IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 56, 58 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995).
235. Umbreit, supra note 234, at 56-58.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 56-57.
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and reach an agreement regarding restitution.239 In some cases the
restitution is monetary, while in others, the parties may agree that the
offender will "work" for the victim to pay off his or her debt.240
Although mediators do not impose restitution settlements, approxi-
mately ninety-five percent of mediation meetings result in signed res-
titution agreements. 2 1
Community service provides a method of sanctioning the criminal
offender, without incarceration, while providing substantial benefits to
the community. 242 Orders to perform community service basically re-
quire an offender to perform community-based labor without pay.243
While such a program may sound attractive in theory, community ser-
vice has been an underused criminal sanction for several reasons.244
First, community service sentences are not perceived as credible be-
cause a state invariably does not have a follow-up procedure to ensure
compliance.245 Second, the costs of community service to the state
may exceed the benefits of such a sentence.246 Finally, it is difficult to
fashion a scheme whereby incarceration sentences can be equally con-
verted into community service time.247 Thus, community service pro-
grams are not only difficult to administer, but also difficult to
evaluate.
2. Electronic Monitoring
Electric monitoring is a relatively new concept in alternative sen-
tencing that has been used by many states in a variety of manners.248
There are different types of electronic monitoring available today, and
technology continues to afford new alternatives. 249 Two forms of elec-
tronic monitoring involve the use of electronic wristbands or home
239. Id. at 57.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Introduction to Community Service, in INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN OVERCROWDED
TIMES 69, 72 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995).
243. Douglas C. McDonald, Community Service Sentences, in INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN
OVERCROWDED TIMES 72, 72 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995).
244. Introduction to Community Service, supra note 242, at 69-72.
245. Id. at 71.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. JOAN PETERSILIA, EXPANDING OPTIONS FOR CRIMINAL SENTENCING 34 (1987). At a
minimum, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah and Virginia use electronic monitoring as an alternative
method of sentencing. Id.
249. Terry L. Baumer & Michael G. Maxfield, Electronically Monitored Home Detention, in




confinement.250 Electronic wristbands involve the use of radio fre-
quency systems,251 while electronically monitored home confinement
is accomplished through the use of an automated computer contact
system.2 52 In both these methods, law enforcement authorities are
electronically informed if the inmate exits a specifically approved
area.253 Preliminary cost-benefit analysis indicates that, per inmate,
electronic monitoring programs are less costly than incarceration, and
provide an effective alternative to imprisonment.254 Furthermore,
electronic monitoring has been reported to have an eighty-one per-
cent success rate.255 However, economic analysis has also indicated
that in many circumstances additional costs may be required, thereby
making the programs unattractive to some states.2 56
3. Intensive Supervision
Intensive supervision programs ("ISP") are generally known as pro-
bationary or parole programs. 257 Usually, the purpose of an ISP is to
facilitate public safety through effective control over an offender, at a
much more economical cost to the taxpayer than the costs of incarcer-
ation.258 A variety of programs are implemented to achieve this pur-
pose, which range from drug-testing to home visits. 259 In addition, ISP
programs may utilize other sanctions, such as community service,
counseling or mandatory employment. 260 The ratio ranges anywhere
250. Id. at 104.
251. Id. at 104-06. For example, a person convicted of aggravated assault might be sentenced
to wear an electronic wristband, which usually limits the distance the offender can travel from his
home. Id. If he leaves that designated area, an electronic signal would be conveyed to the
authorities that he has breached the terms of his sentence. Id.
252. Id. at 105. Although automated computer programs vary, compliance is monitored
through random computer-generated telephone calls. Id. During these random telephone calls,
a variety of information is requested and analyzed (i.e. the client may be requested to perform
certain tasks, or the computer may perform a voice analysis to determine whether the person
answering the questions is, in fact, the sentenced offender). Id.
253. Id. at 105-06.
254. Id. at 106.
255. Michael G. Maxfield & Terry L. Baumer, Electronic Monitoring in Marion County, Indi-
ana, in INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 108, 109 (Michael Tonry & Kate
Hamilton eds., 1995). The 81% success results are based on an analysis of the electronic moni-
toring program implemented in Marion County, Indiana. Id. at 108-09.
256. Baumer & Maxfield, supra note 249, at 106. Cost-effectiveness is based on the method in
which costs are calculated. Id. In some cases, the program will be unable to generate enough
user fees to cover program costs. Id. It is therefore advisable for a state to perform a cost-
benefit analysis prior to implementing an electronic monitoring program. Id.
257. Richard Will, Intensive Supervision, in INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN OVERCROWDED
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from ten to twenty-five parolees to every one probation officer.261
Currently, at least forty states have adopted some form of ISP, includ-
ing California and Illinois.2 62
ISP's have been implemented for various purposes: 1) an early re-
lease program; 2) a prison alternative; or 3) a method of control over
high-risk probationers. 263 Each state's ISP program can differ greatly
from another's in both the goals of the program and its application. 264
Furthermore, the success of any ISP program depends in large part on
whether the participants were properly selected, whether the program
was cost-effective, or whether there was, in fact, a reduction in rates of
recidivism.265 For example, a RAND Corporation study of Califor-
nia's ISP program resulted in mixed findings.266 Based on analysis of
the ISP program alone, the RAND study found no reduction in recidi-
vism rates, but did find that cost savings could be achieved.2 67 The
California study identified that ISP average costs per offender were
$7,240 to $8,902 per year,2 68 a notable savings compared to incarcera-
tion.269 It should be noted, however, that the effectiveness of any ISP
program depends on a variety of variables that may be involved. 270
4. Day Reporting Centers
Day reporting centers have also been considered as alternatives to
incarceration, not only for the attractiveness of cost containment, but
also for the emphasis placed on rehabilitation.271 Studies on the effec-
tiveness of ISPs have indicated a success rate of anywhere between
sixty-eight percent and ninety-seven percent in safely managing the
261. Id.
262. Id. at 89-90.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 90.
265. Id.
266. Richard Will, California ISP Programs Evaluated, in INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN
OVERCROWDED TIMES 91, 91-94 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995).
267. Id. at 92-93. The Rand study found that although the ISP program advocating supervi-
sion alone might not be successful in cutting down on recidivism, the study found that a combi-
nation of supervision and treatment or counseling may be successful. Id. In addition, the study
noted that monies spent on monitoring and incarceration may be better spent on substance
abuse treatment and vocational training and placement. Id.
268. Id. at 93.
269. Orlov, supra note 188, at N4.
270. Will, supra note 257, at 90-91. For example, results may vary based on the offender
population participants that were chosen, or whether offenders were in fact prison-bound. Id. at
90.
271. Dale G. Parent, Day-Reporting Centers, in INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN OVERCROWDED
TIMES 125, 125-28 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995).
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offenders in society. 272 At least eight states have implemented some
form of this sentencing procedure, although the programs and eligibil-
ity vary from state to state.273 In Massachusetts, day reporting center
programs consist of home confinement of the inmate, whereby the in-
mate resides in the home, while reporting on a daily basis to a case
manager.274 Case managers also check on inmates twice a day.275 In-
mates must complete, for approval, an extensive itinerary of the next
twenty-four hours, which identifies the inmate's location at all
times,276 and are required to be employed or enrolled in school during
his participation in the program.277
5. Adult Correctional Boot Camp Programs
Boot camps represent yet another alternative to incarceration for
perpetrators of nonviolent crimes. 278 Boot camps have become popu-
lar in recent years as a result of prison overcrowding and the public
demand to see criminals punished.279 As of 1995, there were at least
twenty-seven states that operate some form of adult boot camp pro-
gram, eight states that operate juvenile boot camp programs, and two
states that utilize federal boot camp programs. 280 Boot camps are pre-
mised on the idea that "short, intensive, and extremely harsh pro-
grams would give structure to the lives of offenders and would
perhaps rehabilitate them. 2 81 One of the main goals of boot camps is
rehabilitation through a disciplinary regimen, as well as treatment
programs. 282 It is the belief of boot camp officers that graduates of
the program have gained greater positive and pro-social attitudes,
272. Id. at 127. A study of ISP's in Minnesota reported a 98% success rate in completion of
the program. Id. A survey of four day centers in Massachusetts revealed a 78% success rate:
20% of the failure rate was attributed to program violations and 2% to new crimes and escapes.
John F. Larivee, Day-Reporting in Massachusetts, in INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN OVER-
CROWDED TIMES 128, 130-31 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995). Similarly, the Crime
and Justice Foundation's Metropolitan Day Reporting Center reported similar results with a
67% success rate, 30% failure for program violations, and 3% failure for new crimes and es-
capes. Id.
273. Parent, supra note 271, at 126.




278. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL BOOT
CAMP PROGRAMS vii (1995) [hereinafter BOOT CAMP STANDARDS].
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.; see PETERSILIA, supra note 248, at 61.
282. BOOT CAMP STANDARDS, supra note 278, at vii.
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made educational achievements, and shown a positive level of courte-
ousness and agreeability. 283
Boot camps must pass a rigorous accreditation program, and pro-
vide mission statements, goals, and measurable objectives for partici-
pants.284 Studies have generally concluded that offenders who attend
boot camps have better behaviors while in the boot camps, but recidi-
vism rates are not necessarily better than recidivism rates for incarcer-
ated persons.285 Boot camps may be able to reduce costs, prison
populations, and recidivism, but the conditions necessary to achieve
such effectiveness are rarely, if ever, satisfied. Therefore, boot camps
may only be effective if run under very different and strict
guidelines. 286
A variety of alternative sentencing procedures have been used ten-
tatively in the past, but the potential for more frequent use remains.
Because the holding in People v. Superior Court (Romero)28 7 rein-
states the role of judicial discretion in sentencing three strikes felons,
the courts retain the possibility of using these alternative sentencing
procedures in sentencing nonviolent criminals.
H. California's Three Strikes Law and The Separation of Powers
On June 20, 1996, the California Supreme Court decision People v.
Superior Court (Romero) successfully circumvented California's con-
troversial three strikes legislation aimed at restricting judicial discre-
tion in the sentencing of habitual criminals.288
1. Procedural History
The defendant in Romero was charged with drug possession.289 He
also had four prior convictions for drug possession, second degree
burglary, attempted burglary, and first degree burglary.290 As a result,
the defendant was a candidate for life imprisonment under Califor-
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Dale G. Parent, Boot Camps Failing to Achieve Goals, in INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN
OVERCROWDED TIMES 139, 140 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995). The evaluation,
conducted by the National Institute of Justice and a multi-state evaluation, was based on Lou-
siana's boot camp and compared boot camp graduates and offenders receiving other sentences.
Id.
286. Id. at 140-41; see BOOT CAMP STANDARDS, supra note 278, at vii.
287. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
288. William Claiborne, '3 Strikes' Sentencing Overturned, WASH. POST, June 21, 1996, at Al
LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File; see Maura Dolan & Tony Perry, Justices Deal Blow to '3
Strikes,' L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1996, at Al.
289. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Ct. App. 1995).
290. Id. at 370.
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nia's three strikes sentencing law.291 The offense at issue, drug posses-
sion, carried the much lighter penalty of one to six years
imprisonment.292 The defendant pled not guilty to the charge, and at
hearing, over prosecution's objection, Judge William D. Mudd offered
to strike Romero's previous felony convictions if he changed his plea
to guilty.293 The district court considered many factors in making its
offer to the defendant: 1) the history of the law; 2) the prosecution's
objection to the offer based on Section 1385 of the California Penal
Code;294 3) the defendant's background; and 4) the court's knowl-
edge.295 The court subsequently struck the defendant's prior felony
convictions, in direct violation of Section 1385, and imposed a six year
sentence as opposed to the sentence of life imprisonment mandated
under Section 1385.
The district attorney petitioned for a writ of mandate to reverse the
Superior Court's decision to strike Romero's prior felony convic-
tions.296 The court of appeals subsequently determined the lower
court went beyond the bounds of its discretion in dismissing the con-
victions on its own motion.297 Therefore, the appellate court issued a
writ requiring that the sentence be vacated, and that the defendant be
permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.298 Subsequently the California
Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for review.299
2. California Supreme Court Analysis
In its analysis, the California Supreme Court reviewed the relevant
sections of the California Penal Code.3°° The court also relied primar-
ily on its holding in People v. Tenorio301 to overrule the appellate
court's decision. 30 2 Tenorio stated that "[t]he prosecutor has never
291. Id. at 371.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 370.
294. Section 1385 "does not authorize a judge to strike any prior conviction of a serious felony
for purposes of enhancement of a sentence" under three strikes legislation. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1385 (West 1996).
295. Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 371.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 382.
298. Id. at 383.
299. People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
300. Id. at 628. The relevant sections of the CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE at issue are sections
667, 1170.12, two substantially similar portions of California's three strikes statute, section 1385,
which addresses prosecutorial discretion CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1170.12, 1385 (West 1988 &
Supp 1998).
301. 473 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1970) (holding that the legislation in question had allowed an imper-
missible prosecutorial veto over judicial discretion to dismiss a defendant's prior convictions).
302. Id.
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been able to 'exercise' the power to dismiss a charged prior-he has
only been able to invite the judicial exercise of that power. '30 3 The
supreme court held that allowing a prosecutor the sole power to dis-
miss a defendant's prior convictions was an impermissible violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers, which extend to the state via
Article XIV of the United States Constitution.30 4
The court reasoned that while a legislature may in fact remove the
judiciary's discretion through imposed legislation, the legislature had
not done so in this instance, but had merely restricted the manner of
judicial discretion. 30 5 Stated simply, the legislature prevented the ju-
diciary from reducing a defendant's sentence under the three strikes
law, but it did not "implicitly eliminat[e] the court's power to impose a
lesser punishment by dismissing, or striking sentencing allegations,
under section 1385. '' 306 In conclusion, the supreme court reasoned
that because the district court retains the power to grant the prosecu-
tion's motion to strike prior felony convictions "in the furtherance of
justice," the court could similarly strike such convictions sua sponte. 30 7
Romero was applied retroactively to those cases then on appeal, and
to the extent appellate relief was no longer available, offered recon-
sideration of the sentence upon the filing of a writ of habeas corpus. 30 8
3. Legislative Reaction to People v. Superior Court (Romero)
The California legislature reacted immediately to the Romero hold-
ing with the General Assembly's passage of Senate Bill 331.309 If ap-
proved by the Senate, S.B. 331 would have effectively curtailed
judicial discretion in the wake of Romero by barring the judiciary
from dismissing prior felony conviction allegations for violent felo-
nies.310 Under S.B. 331, only nonviolent felonies could be dismissed,
and only if the current felony was committed more than five years
after the defendant was released from custody for the prior felony
303. Id. at 996-97.
304. U.S. CONST. art. XIV.
305. Romero, 917 P.2d at 628.
306. Id. at 640.
307. Id. at 646.
308. Id. at 648 n.13.
309. Dan Morain, Assembly OKs Bill Limiting Judges' 3-Strikes Leniency, L.A. TIMES, July
10, 1996, at Al. California Senate Republican Leader Rob Hurtt and three strikes activist Mike
Reynolds were the main forces behind the modified three strikes legislation aimed at circum-
venting the California Supreme Court decision in People v. Superior Court (Romero) that re-
turned sentencing discretion to judges in three strikes cases. Id.
310. Stephanie Stone, California Senate Committee Strikes Three Strikes' Measure Limiting
Judges' Sentencing Ability, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, July 18, 1996, available in 1996 WL399702.
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conviction.311 However, on July 16, 1996, a four-to-one vote of the
Senate Criminal Procedure Committee rejected S.B. 331, thereby de-
nying the bill's opportunity for a full Senate hearing.312 The Commit-
tee cited confusing language and concern over the fact that eighty
percent of felons sentenced under three strikes laws are nonviolent as
the primary factors in rejecting the bill.313 Three strikes laws propo-
nents have not abandoned their cause, however, with Senate Republi-
can Leader Rob Hurtt's current legislation and new initiative plans for
the 1998 ballot.314
4. Impact of People v. Superior Court (Romero)
It will continue to be some time yet before the effects of Romero, if
any, will be seen in the criminal justice system, the prison population,
or state appropriations. Specifically, the results of cases on reconsid-
eration, the numbers of three strikes offenders being sentenced to in-
determinate life sentences, and the criminal justice system backlog,
are yet unknown. However, early reports indicate that the Romero
holding will not have a radical impact on the current application of the
law.315
II. ANALYSIS
California's three strikes legislation can be viewed as a strategic
political maneuver that promised to protect the public. In reality, evi-
dence shows that this law has not achieved its intended protections. 316
Many citizens live in fear of crime and are angry that horrible crimes
committed by recidivists such as those against Kimber Reynolds and
Polly Klaas occur.317 Yet, however tragic these crimes may be, they do
not justify the political support of a law that further intensifies serious
problems inherent within the criminal justice system, especially in
light of the variety of alternative sentencing procedures that currently
exist throughout the country. Even Marc Klaas, previously heralded
311. Id.
312. Dan Morain & Max Vanzi, Senate Panel Blocks Revisions of 3-Strikes Law, L.A. TIMES,
July 17, 1996, at Al.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See, e.g., id (reporting that, according to Superior Court Judge J. Stephen Czuleger,
"trial judges would rarely grant leniency to repeat felons" because the judiciary is for the most
part conservative); see also Leslie Wolf, A Few Felons Here Escape Full Force of 3-Strikes Law,
SAN DIEGO UNION & TRW., July 9, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
(reporting that isolated cases of judges striking, previous felony convictions have been noted, but
that such cases are exceptions rather than the norm).
316. See supra note 21, 37, 105-09, 185-89 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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as a most vital advocate of three strikes laws after the death of his
twelve year-old daughter, no longer supports such laws.318
It is possible that politicians backing three strikes laws truly believe
the legislation will solve the recidivist problem that plagues the coun-
try, even though the facts show otherwise. Likewise, it is possible that
political support of California's three strikes law was not just a means
of securing public support following the public tidal wave of rage and
fear over the deaths of Kimber and Polly.319 However, it is difficult to
give politicians the benefit of that doubt when faced with the myriad
of crucial issues that have increased in urgency and severity as a result
of three strikes legislation. Thus, three strikes laws can be viewed as
failures in several crucial respects.
In Romero,320 the California Supreme Court had the insight to find
that California's three strikes law violated the doctrine of separation
of powers, thereby reinstating the historical proposition of judicial dis-
cretion. 321 The Romero decision must initially be viewed as an oppor-
tunity to remedy some of the problems intensified by three strikes
laws. In addition, Romero must also be viewed as an opportunity to
move forward with sentencing alternatives better suited to society as a
whole.
A. The Impropriety of Three Strikes Laws
While California's three strikes law effectively removes a large
number of habitual criminals from its streets, it also negatively im-
pacts the citizens in several respects. First, the three strikes law was
pushed as a means to rid the streets of violent habitual criminals, like
those responsible for the deaths of Kimber Reynolds and Polly
Klaas.322 However, the application of three strikes legislation has
318. Pamela J. Podger, Mourning Fathers Now Split Over 3 Strikes, FRESNO BEE, Aug. 28,
1994, at Al, available in 1994 WL 8567151. While Marc Klaas supported the "three strikes"
movement after his daughter's death, he now stands in opposition to the law. Id. He stated that
he was coerced into his endorsement of the law during the grievous period subsequent to Polly's
death. Id. His opinion of the law is that "[iut is too soft on hard crime and too hard on soft
crime." Id. However, Mike Reynolds, Kimber's father, remains committed to supporting the
law. Id.
319. But see Charles L. Lindner, '3 Strikes' Decision Still Leaves Option of Tough Sentences,
FRESNO BEE, June 25, 1996, at B7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fresno File (identifying
that 1994 Assembly Speaker Willie Brown "confessed that Three Strikes was crazy public policy,
but that it was political suicide to vote against it. Put simply, the politicians needed the state
Supreme Court to stop them from making impossible policies that the Legislature could not
conceivably finance without gutting the state budget" (emphasis added)).
320. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
321. Claiborne, supra note 288, at Al.
322. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998); see supra note 19.
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been much stricter than people may have expected, sentencing a ma-
jority of nonviolent criminals rather than the intended violent, habit-
ual criminals. 323 Second, a direct consequence of California's three
strikes legislation has been a marked increase in the state's prison
population. 324 Third, California, and the rest of the country, tends to
blame the criminal justice system as a whole for the levels of crime
across the country, yet the all encompassing nature of three strikes
laws has further increased the backlog in the court system.325 Finally,
it is the public who pays for the financial ramifications of three
strikes.326
California's politicians were quick to back the initiative, but failed
to specifically inform the public of the ramifications the law would
have on the system. If this failure was more than mere oversight-if
the lawmakers knew exactly what they were doing when they failed to
inform the public about the ramifications of the law-then serious
questions must be raised about the propriety and intent of the
lawmakers who backed California's three strikes legislation.
1. Disproportionate and Discriminatory Effects of Three Strikes
Laws
Three strikes laws have accomplished far more than just ridding the
streets of violent habitual criminals. California's three strikes law has
sentenced at least 14,000 second-time felony offenders and 1,300
third-time felony offenders. 327 Of that total number of criminals sen-
tenced under the three strikes law, only fifteen percent were sen-
tenced for violent crimes, and six percent were sentenced for serious
crimes. 328 Thus, that a disproportionate eighty percent of criminals
sentenced under three strikes law were incarcerated for nonviolent
crimes.329 The majority of nonviolent criminals sentenced under three
strikes laws are drug users and petty thieves.330
It is undisputed that the United States has severe crime and drug
problems. However, can it be said that the citizens of California in-
tended to lock up nonviolent drug users for twenty-five years to life?
323. See Ingram, supra note 21, at A3.
324. Mergenhagen, supra note 157, at 2; see also Cannon, supra note 41, at Al (identifying a
study that questions whether this law is just, due to the large number of nonviolent offenders
who are incarcerated).
325. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 88-98 and accompanying text.
327. Cannon, supra note 41, at Al.
328. Ingram, supra note 21, at A3 (discussing a California Department of Corrections study).
329. Id.
330. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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Or, to be more graphic, did the citizens of California intend to sen-
tence a man to life imprisonment for stealing a piece of pizza? 331 The
case of the pizza man may not be representative of the nonviolent
felons sentenced under three strikes laws, but it is strikingly illustra-
tive of the all-encompassing reach of California's three strikes law.
The three strikes law also has a discriminatory effect on the persons
sentenced under its guidelines. A California Department of Correc-
tions report has identified that forty-three percent of the criminals
convicted under three strikes laws are African-Americans. 332 There-
fore, not only do three strikes laws disproportionately sentence sec-
ond and third-time felony offenders in relation to crimes committed,
but they also disproportionately and discrminatorily sentence more
African-Americans than any other cognizable racial or ethnic group.
Specifically, African-Americans are sentenced under three strikes
laws at a rate of thirteen-to-one over Caucasians. 333 A strong argu-
ment proposed by critics contends that the racial disparity results from
the disproportionate number of black district attorneys (approx-
iatmely 85) versus white district attorneys (approximately 1,200) pros-
ecuting three strikes cases.334 The criticism stems from the
proposition that racism toward blacks at the charging stage is respon-
sible for the disparity.335 This is because the district attorney retains
the discretion to dismiss prior convictions of criminal defendant's eli-
gible for sentencing under three strikes laws.336 Upon review of the
written intent of the three strikes initiative, it cannot be concluded
that such punishments were the intent of the citizens of California.337
Rather, the intent of three strikes laws was to punish those violent,
habitual criminals who are a true threat to society.338
2. Burgeoning Prison Population
Approximately 15,300 criminals have been sentenced under Califor-
nia's three strikes law.339 This factor alone is largely responsible for
331. DiSpoldo, supra note 37, at 10 (discussing sentencing of nonviolent criminals under three
strikes laws for nonviolent and even frivolous crimes).
332. Ingram, supra note 21, at A3.




337. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 1988 & Supp 1998); see supra note 19.
338. See supra note 19.
339. Cannon, supra note 41, at Al.
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the corresponding increase in California's prison population. 340 The
recurring problem today, however, is that criminals are not being sen-
tenced for six, ten or even fifteen year terms, but rather twenty-five
years to life. Current prisons are not equipped to handle this increase.
California's prison system is presently operating at 192% of its in-
tended capacity, and thirteen of California's penal institutions are op-
erating at more than 200% capacity.341 Essentially, there are three
options: 1) continue to overcrowd the already burgeoning California
prisons; 2) construct new prison facilities to handle the overload; or 3)
grant prisoners an early release to make room for the incoming pris-
oners. California has elected to do all three. California's governor
has been pushing for state approval of a plan to build six new prison
facilities, but has been met with strong opposition.342 As an alterna-
tive to building new prison facilities, many criminals imprisoned for
violent crimes prior to the enactment of three strikes have been
granted early release.343 California has used early release to make
room for the incoming criminals convicted under three strikes law, the
large majority of whom were sentenced for nonviolent crimes.3 " It
can hardly be said that this was the result the citizens of California
expected-to have violent criminals released so that nonviolent
criminals could be sent to prison for twenty-five years to life.
3. Three Strikes Laws Overburden the Criminal Justice System
One of the theories behind three strikes laws was that they would
speed recidivists through the criminal justice system on a "no ques-
tions asked" basis. 345 In reality, the converse result has occurred. The
criminal justice system in California is now dealing with an increased
number of jury trials, a problem it did not face prior to three strikes
laws.346 In essence, three strikes can be blamed for increasing the
backlog in the California criminal justice system. Furthermore, it
could have been anticipated that the harsh penalties rendered under
three strikes laws would create a backlog in the criminal justice sys-
340. See supra note 153 and accompanying text; see also Cannon, supra note 41, at Al (ques-
tioning the justice of the law, since the dramatic prison population increase has resulted largely
from sentencing nonviolent felons).
341. Andy Furillo, Pressures Building in State's 32 Prisons, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 19, 1997,
at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sacbee File.
342. See supra notes 155-60.
343. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
345. King, supra note 20, at A3; see also WELSH, supra note 158, at xiii.
346. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
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tem, which is contrary to the goals of the citizens and legislators who
pushed the law.
4. Financial Burdens of Three Strikes Laws
When faced with the overwhelming increase in convicted criminals
sent to prison, the question arises whether the public was aware of the
number of people who would be sentenced under three strikes legisla-
tion. If the public was aware of how high that number would be, a
second question must arise whether they realized the financial impact
the law would have on the state. The funds to pay for the conse-
quences of three strikes legislation (i.e. court costs and imprisonment)
must come from somewhere. Whether funds are diverted from an-
other area of the state government, received from the federal govern-
ment, or directly taxed on the public, someone must pay the costs for
those criminals accused and sentenced under three strikes or any
criminal laws. 347 The taxpayer pays for the housing for all criminals
sentenced to prison, and one may assume the taxpayer accepts the
state's allocation of funds. However, when faced with paying the cost
of life imprisonment for a man whose third offense was stealing some
cookies from a restaurant,348 the taxpayer may be more concerned
about how those state funds are spent. With prison housing costing
approximately $21,375 per year, per inmate,349 those are some pretty
expensive cookies.
In California, jury trials are up at least forty percent, and that in-
crease is considered a direct result of the three strikes legislation. 350
The state is responsible for paying the costs of every criminal case that
goes to trial.351 Thus, for every nonviolent crime charged under a
three strikes law that goes to trial, the taxpayer is paying the higher
cost of a jury trial instead of the lower cost of a plea bargain.
B. Theoretical Problems with Three Strikes Laws
There are two main theoretical problems that arise as a conse-
quence of three strikes legislation. First, how does one justify the
business of building prisons to house criminals convicted under three
strikes laws? Second, how does one justify the severity of a twenty-
347. See supra notes 40, 93, 157, 180-81 and accompanying text.
348. DiSpaldo, supra note 37, at 10 (identifying a man who received an indeterminate life
sentence for breaking into a restaurant and stealing some cookies).
349. Orlov, supra note 188, at N4
350. Butterfield, supra note 99, at Al.
351. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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five years to life sentence in connection with a third strike felony that
is nonviolent?
1. Prisons for Profit
The building of prisons for profit has become a hot commodity on
the stock exchange.352 States now contract with private entities to
build and manage new private prison facilities. 353 Prison conditions
at many older state facilities are abhorrent, and therefore, new prisons
afford inmates better living conditions. However, the money used to
build and manage private prison facilities could just as easily be used
to fund new state operated institutions. The practice of privatizing
prisons, therefore, raises two problematic issues. First, private compa-
nies with no relationship to the criminal or the victim profit from the
incarceration of a criminal.354 Second, state funding of a private
prison system adds a foreign element of politics to the criminal justice
system. 355 For example, suppose a politician were to give in to polit-
ical pressure from a private prison lobbying group seeking to pass
more stringent sentencing laws. Business people in the "prison indus-
try" would essentially be pushing the legislature to increase the sever-
ity of sentencing laws. Any such increase would protect the private
prisons' interests, by requiring that additional prisons be built, or by
keeping the current private prisons in business turning profits. This
policy is inherently wrong. There should be no opportunity for a pri-
vate business interest group to lobby politicians for favorable legisla-
tion that affects our criminal justice system for the sole purpose of
increasing their profit margins.
2. Sentences Unjustified for Nonviolent Felons
Constitutional claims of cruel and unusual punishment, due to
sentences being disproportionate to the crime in nonviolent three
strikes convictions, have failed.356 Although these constitutional
claims have failed, the argument remains that these sentences are sim-
ply unfair. One can look at a life sentence imposed for the third strike
of stealing a piece of pizza, and rationally determine that the sentence
is unfair or disproportional.
352. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 180 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 182 and accompanying text.
356. See, e.g., People v. O'Roark, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 870 (Ct. App. 1996); People v. Ruiz, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 561 (Ct. App. 1996); People v. Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Ct. App.
1995).
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The problem inherent in California's three strikes law is that it is
completely discretionless. The only question raised is whether a per-
son committed three felonies-the law is not tailored to encompass
only violent criminals. Furthermore, it does not place any limits on
the time frames in which the felonies are committed. 357 For example,
imagine a young man living in California, who has been convicted of
two nonviolent crimes. He received probation for both crimes and
went on to lead a productive life as a member of society. Twenty
years later, he commits another nonviolent crime and is sentenced to
an indeterminate life sentence under California's three strikes law. It
can hardly be said that he was a habitual criminal.
There is no doubt that the public is tired of violent, habitual
criminals being released back into society. Similarly, it is easy to see
why the public is tired of habitual petty criminals receiving either light
sentences or early release. A felony is a serious crime, and serious
crimes should be punished. However, there are better and more cost
effective methods for punishing and rehabilitating nonviolent
criminals. These alternative punishments would cost a fraction of
what it would cost to house a prisoner sentenced for twenty-five years
to life.358 It seems apparent that sentencing a nonviolent criminal to a
rehabilitation program would not only be more proportional and hu-
mane than imposing an indeterminate life sentence, but also much less
costly. California's three strikes law completely removed judicial dis-
cretion in sentencing. Romero's holding affords a necessary return to
that historical principle. Therefore, Romero must be viewed as an op-
portunity to actively pursue sentencing alternatives to incarceration.
III. ALTERNATIVE DIRECTIONS
There are a multitude of sentencing procedures, currently in use
throughout the country, that are just as effective as three strikes laws
and less costly to the public. Every single state in the country has
some form of mandatory minimum sentencing legislation in place. 359
It seems, therefore, that the states believe the mandatory minimums
are necessary to act as both a deterrent to other criminals, and as a
retributivist punishment to the criminal being sentenced. In addition
to mandatory minimum sentencing, many states employ consecutive
sentencing, sentence enhancements, and extended sentencing provi-
sions.360 Furthermore, all states have the ability to hold aggravation
357. See CAL. PENAL CODE §667 (West 1988 & Supp 1998).
358. See supra notes 214-88.
359. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 111, at 21-22.
360. See supra notes 127-41 and accompanying text.
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or mitigation hearings to determine the appropriate sentence for a
criminal. 361
Minimum sentences are just that-minimums. They can be in-
creased so long as they do not exceed the maximum sentence allowed
by statute. Many states, in response to recidivism, have enacted habit-
ual sentencing laws or de facto three strikes laws.362 Even these habit-
ual sentencing laws may not be necessary in light of the emergence of
truth-in-sentencing acts.363 If states were to enact and abide by truth-
in-sentencing laws, the possibility of parole for violent criminals would
be removed. Three strikes laws are simply an unnecessary sentencing
procedure. Illinois is an excellent example of a state that has enacted
a wide variety of sentencing procedures. For example, Illinois em-
ploys the use of mandatory minimum/maximum sentencing, concur-
rent sentencing, an habitual criminal act, and truth-in-sentencing
legislation, all of which are centered around that state's felony classifi-
cation system.364 Thus, a variety of sentencing procedures exist which
utilize judicial discretion in sentencing the violent criminal.
Furthermore, a multitude of sentencing alternatives are in place
throughout the country that replace incarceration as a punishment for
nonviolent criminals. The least restrictive alternatives a judge may
impose are monetary penalties, restitution, mediation, or community
service.365 These options serve not only to punish the criminal, but
also to contribute to society and/or compensate the victims of crimes.
More supervised forms of punishment are available for nonviolent
criminals who may be considered a more questionable safety risk. As
discussed previously, these alternative punishments include electronic
monitoring, intensive supervision, day reporting centers, and adult
correctional boot camp programs. 366 These programs are more eco-
nomical than imprisonment and provide an opportunities for the con-
victed criminals to participate in rehabilitative programs. In this way,
not only are nonviolent offenders punished for their crimes, but they
are also given the opportunity to become productive members of
society.
While current studies indicate that such alternative sentencing pro-
grams are no more effective than imprisonment, these studies have
not demonstrated that alternative sentencing programs are less effec-
361. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824 (1991).
362. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
364. Aspen, supra note 122, at 348-49 (discussing Illinois' Class X sentencing law).
365. See supra notes 218-48 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 249-87 and accompanying text.
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tive than imprisonment. 367 At this point in history, rehabilitation and
retribution by themselves have failed. It is time to implement a more
innovative sentencing policy that will benefit society as a whole,
namely a combination approach that encompasses education, preven-
tion, rehabilitation, and retribution. Past and current policies have
been an ineffective deterrent on crime-the time has come for change.
IV. CONCLUSION
At best, it can be said that the people of California were unaware of
the ramifications of supporting the three strikes initiative. At the
same time, it can hardly be said that California's lawmakers were
equally unaware. 368 It is the politician's job to do what is in the best
interests of the constituents, who are likely unaware of the grave im-
pact of the laws they seek to have passed. While politicians cannot be
expected to know every ramification of a law they support, likewise
they should not be expected to react in a "knee-jerk" fashion in pass-
ing a law based primarily on public outrage over two brutal murders.
California lawmakers did not act in the best interests of the people
when they pushed a law that overburdened the criminal justice sys-
tem, contributed to a skyrocketing prison population, provided for the
early release of violent criminals, and required increased state spend-
ing in the areas of prison housing and criminal litigation, thereby re-
quiring diversion of funds from other important areas of state
spending and increases in taxes.
People v. Superior Court (Romero)369 must be viewed as a chance to
rectify the problems compounded by California's three strikes law,
and as a necessary return to the historical function of judicial discre-
tion. Without such judicial discretion, one can easily see the ramifica-
tions on the prison system, the criminal justice system, and society as a
whole. California is a representative example of a state suffering from
such adverse ramifications.
Instead of viewing Romero as a new beginning, it will probably be
viewed by the public and politicians as another judicial effort to be
soft on criminals. It is shameful that the public is not truly aware of
the realities and gravity of the issues involved, and that people in the
position to give them that information are unwilling to do so. People
see crime and they want to put an end to it. Politicians, regretfully,
are only too eager to please the people who keep them elected, argua-
367. See supra notes 241-79 and accompanying text.
368. Lindner, supra note 319, at B7 (reporting that it would have been political suicide for a
politician to vote against the proposed three strikes law in 1994).
369. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
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bly at all costs. The truth of the matter is that there are severe costs
attached to California's three strikes law-financially, factually, and
theoretically. If not for the Romero holding, one can only speculate
what steps other states might have taken toward remodeling their laws
to mirror California's three strikes law.
Furthermore, three strikes laws have failed as deterrents to crime.
Criminals are very much aware of three strikes laws, as well as their
application and sentencing ramifications. This conclusion can be in-
ferred from the incredible number of felons sentenced under three
strikes.370 This conclusion can also be seen in some specific factual
instances. At one end of the spectrum, Kevin Lee Robinson con-
spired to bomb various county buildings hoping to destroy his criminal
records and thereby avoid trial and sentencing under three strikes
laws, putting innocent people's lives in jeopardy in the process.371 At
the other end of the spectrum, Clinton James Warner took his own life
so that he would not be forced to serve an indeterminate life sentence
under three strikes laws for his charge of drug possession. 372 The facts
surrounding three strikes laws indicate that an extraordinarily large
number of habitual offenders have been convicted and sentenced
under these laws, yet habitual criminals are not deterred from com-
mitting further crimes.
The rehabilitation model of punishment has failed, but so has the
retribution model. The time has come to focus on a combination ap-
proach-namely education, prevention, rehabilitation, and retribu-
tion. Educate the people and prevent them from turning to crime and
drugs in the first place. Rehabilitate and punish nonviolent criminals
through the extensive variety of alternative sentencing programs
available. Finally, punish those violent criminals who deserve it
through incarceration. Punishment of violent criminals is what the
prison system was developed for, and should remain the purpose of
prison systems.
370. Cannon, supra note 41, at Al (identifying that approximately 15,300 felons in California
have been convicted and sentenced under three strikes law).
371. Harris, supra note 108, at A3.
372. Hoyer, supra note 109, at B4.
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